** This was the situation, but the information
was not presented to the Air France 447 crew.
To the designers of the flight control software,
it must have seemed inconceivable.**
Key Takeaways:
The Air France 447 accident highlighted critical challenges in the human-machine interface of highly automated aircraft, particularly when pilots are unexpectedly forced into manual control during an emergency.
Pilot confusion and failure to recover from a stall were attributed to insufficient training in high-altitude manual flying, stall recovery, and dealing with the "startle effect" during unforeseen events.
The Airbus design philosophy, which minimizes redundant cues and tactile feedback (e.g., non-linked sidesticks, non-moving throttles), contributed to the crew's difficulty in understanding and controlling the aircraft's state.
The article suggests that while advanced automation protects the aircraft, it fails to adequately support human pilots during abrupt transitions from computer-mediated to manual control, leaving them disoriented and prone to errors.
You’re flying a twin-engine jet transport. The engines are at full power. The wings are rocking, but the heading is steady. The pitch attitude is 15 degrees nose up, but the VSI says that you are descending at 10,000 fpm. The flight director needles command a nose-up pitch.
What should you do?
CREATE A FREE ACCOUNT
Sign up to keep reading
Create a free account to continue. Already a member? Sign in below.
Peter Garrison taught himself to use a slide rule and tin snips, built an airplane in his backyard, and flew it to Japan. He began contributing to FLYING in 1968, and he continues to share his columns, ""Technicalities"" and ""Aftermath,"" with FLYING readers.
