** This was the situation, but the information
was not presented to the Air France 447 crew.
To the designers of the flight control software,
it must have seemed inconceivable.**
Key Takeaways:
The Air France 447 accident exposed critical issues where highly automated systems abruptly disengaged due to an unexpected event, leading to profound crew confusion and a failure of basic airmanship.
The incident highlighted significant shortcomings in pilot training, particularly in manual high-altitude flying, stall recovery, and preparing crews for the "startle effect" of sudden, complex emergencies.
Airbus's aircraft design philosophy, characterized by non-communicating sidesticks, hidden trim, and limited tactile feedback, was criticized for exacerbating pilot disorientation during the transition from automated to manual flight.
The article argues that while fly-by-wire systems protect aircraft, their design often fails to protect human crews, leading to difficulties when pilots are thrust unexpectedly back into manual control from an "out of the loop" state.
You’re flying a twin-engine jet transport. The engines are at full power. The wings are rocking, but the heading is steady. The pitch attitude is 15 degrees nose up, but the VSI says that you are descending at 10,000 fpm. The flight director needles command a nose-up pitch.
What should you do?
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Peter Garrison taught himself to use a slide rule and tin snips, built an airplane in his backyard, and flew it to Japan. He began contributing to FLYING in 1968, and he continues to share his columns, ""Technicalities"" and ""Aftermath,"" with FLYING readers.
