Aviation Safety

The question comes up time and again in the FBOs pilot lounge and on aviation-related forums: Does a known fault make an airplane unairworthy? Time and again when faced with this question, I hear the response, “TOMATO FLAMES” for an aircraft in VFR-day conditions, a mnemonic referring to the items required under FAR 91.205 for day VFR. This is part of the answer, but it is neither the beginning nor the end of determining the airworthiness of an aircraft with a known fault. Instead of a simple, “one-size-fits-all” answer, exploring existing regulations, legal decisions and legal interpretations should guide a pilot or owner in determining whether or not an aircraft with known faults is airworthy. First, lets define “airworthy.” Somewhat surprisingly, “airworthy” isnt defined by the FAA, at least not in FAR Part 1, Definitions and Abbreviations. In 1994, Congress took it upon itself to describe an “airworthiness certificate” as something the FAA Administrator shall issue when he or she “finds that the aircraft conforms to its type certificate and, after inspection, is in condition for safe operation.” Very little additional guidance is available from the 350-plus pages of FAA Advisory Circular AC 8130.2F, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft and Related Products. When attempting to define “airworthy,” the AC basically reaffirms what Congress said.

Go-arounds (sometimes called rejected landings) are something of a “forgotten maneuver” for most pilots. I think this is because the go-around is something were taught as a way to fly away from a botched landing. As we gain more experience and get better at landing, we find ourselves needing this escape route less frequently. The psychology of pilots is such that we try to “recover” from our mistakes, so we also tend to try to turn bad landings into good ones with a nudge of the throttle, a tap on the rudder pedal, or a twist of the controls instead of powering up and climbing away for another try. Instructors can fall into the same trap. Failing to see a reason for a go-around in their experienced students landings, they might not require demonstration of a go-around during a flight review or other recurrent training. If the pilot receiving instruction is instrument-rated, the CFI may consider flying a missed approach to be adequate to demonstrate go-around technique. I must admit for a time I was in that camp as well. When was the last time you practiced a go-around? With experience, ego and unenlightened instruction, it may have been a very long time. So what happens on the day something completely outside the span of your expert aircraft control requires you to call off the landing from a point very near (or even on) the ground?

Even the casual student of why aircraft accidents happen knows that in a large percentage of them, weather is a factor. (Its about 15 percent.) Thats not to say weather caused the accident, just it was implicated as one link in the chain of events that led to the typical accident. When we think “weather,” icing, thunderstorms, low visibility and turbulence come to mind, as well they should. But the NTSBs accident files reveal a particular subset of accidents in which pilots operating in flyable if challenging IMC prang perfectly good airplanes into terrain and obstacles for no apparent reason. The agency throws these into a grab bag category it blandly calls “improper IFR.” This catchall describes a narrow range of sins, but most of them relate to vertical rather than horizontal transgressions. We read enough accident reports to confess a certain discouragement at the level of skill-or lack thereof-of the typical pilot in the U.S. But theres good news: The number of incidents of NTSB-reported improper IFR have declined markedly in recent years. The NTSB reported no accidents in this category between 2006 and 2009, but there were 47 between 1989 and 2005.

The FAA doesnt talk much about spins. Mostly, they want us to learn to avoid them. Clearly, avoiding an inadvertent spin is good, but it might help to know a bit more about them. Plus, the whole specter of Air France 447 crashing into the Atlantic at what French authorities indicate was a very high vertical speed and a nearly level attitude suggests that it might be nice to know a bit about flat spins in particular. Most of us have heard it before: Spin training used to be mandatory, but sometime after WWII it was decided most inadvertent stall/spin accidents occurred at an altitude low enough to make recovery unlikely and neednt be taught. So, the FAA dropped spin training from all but the CFI curriculum and instead began to emphasize spin avoidance. Now, the FAA is taking that one step further by de-emphasizing stall practice and recovery, and instead concentrating on teaching pilots to avoid stalls. With this progression, soon spins and even stalls may be solely the realm of the aerobat and the accident victim. Our goal, of course, is to minimize the latter, so a little education is in order. Well start with a brief discussion of the stall and then focus on the aerodynamics of spins and their recovery. Finally, well take a look at what makes a flat spin.

Off-airport landings are a perennial subject whenever pilots get together, and rightly so. Among the topics inevitably coming up will be whether or not to land on a paved road. After all, you probably took off from pavement; why not try to land on it, too, that too-quiet engine in front of or beside you notwithstanding? We last looked at this overall topic in our December 2006 issue. In that article, we basically concluded theres no free lunch: While a paved road may offer the smoothest, most-familiar surface, it also poses a set of problems others may not-like wires, cars, signs, utility poles and other things you may or may not see before hitting them. While you should be able to spot vehicular traffic and avoid it (presuming one or more drivers dont do something dumb, which isnt always a safe presumption), spotting wires, roadside signage and the odd telephone pole from the air isnt the easiest thing to do. If you dont believe us, try it the next time youre out committing aviation. Dont forget youll be a bit distracted and may not have much time dealing with a real emergency: troubleshooting, cinching belts, calming passengers and performing all the other tasks required after the airplane soils the bed.

Anyone whos spent much time flying personal aircraft has been asked this question: Is it safe? As a rule, the answer is, “It depends.” Because safety is relative, sitting at home can be the safest course of action. But its usually not very rewarding, and sitting at home makes it much more difficult to travel in a personal aircraft. Beginning on page 24 of this issue, we look at a recent accident the NTSB attributed to low-level maneuvering. In critiquing that accident, we referred to the AOPA Air Safety Foundation (AOPA/ASF) and its most recent Nall Report, an annual in-depth look at GA accident trends. The data in those annual reports is very intriguing; so much so, we thought wed examine some of it more closely. We wanted to pose the question, “Is it safe to do X?” when X is some operation, maneuver or decision made by a GA pilot. While every operation and skill level is different, what we really wanted to do is highlight some of the areas in which GA pilots routinely bend metal, with the idea of using the 2007 Nall Report, the most recent available, and its findings to demonstrate why doing what youre about to do might not be a good idea.

Each year, the AOPA Air Safety Foundation (AOPA/ASF) releases its excellent Nall Report, a review of a previous years accidents and causes, taken from NTSB data. And each year when perusing the report, we find pilot-related accidents-as opposed to mechanicals or unknown causes-to lead the pack by an overwhelming margin. In 2006, the last year for which the AOPA/ASF has crunched the NTSB data, pilot-related causes comprised 73.8 percent of all accidents and a whopping 79.1 percent of fatals. In fact, from 1999 through 2006, inclusive, maneuvering has accounted for approximately 25 percent of all accidents in the U.S. The annual numbers vary, but never dip below 20 percent and too-frequently arch above 25 percent. Breaking down the numbers, we find maneuvering accidents as a whole-which AOPA/ASF says “often involve questionable pilot judgment, such as decisions to engage in buzzing, low passes, or other high-risk activities”-outpaced all other fatal accident causes in 2006, including weather and those occurring during the descent/approach flight phases.

Alot has been said elsewhere about recent articles appearing in USA Today questioning federal, state and local investment in airports lacking scheduled service. The articles imply airline passengers are subsidizing general aviation airports and people traveling by air for worthwhile purposes only use the scheduled services provided by airlines; all other types of air transportation and airports lacking scheduled service are frivolous and unworthy of investment. The industrys alphabet soup has done an okay job of responding to these articles. I say “okay” because there is so much more to do, including going on offense, instead of once again adopting the defensive posture seen all too often. Its axiomatic that few people who read the initial articles saw the industrys response: Once something is “out there,” its out there. Of the many things omitted from McPapers attack on GA, heres another: The airlines themselves dont pay to use the infrastructure supplied by the federal government.

I read with interest your article on VFR into IFR conditions (“Inadvertent IFR,” October 2009). It seems to me you missed one of the most obvious aids to maintaining control of the aircraft: Engage the autopilot and fly the plane with the heading bug on the heading indicator. Nothing could be simpler. Using the autopilot keeps turns at appropriate angles and gives you time to communicate and sort things out. The only additional factor to keep in mind is to maintain proper trim.

The airplane was substantially damaged at 0830 Eastern time after losing lift during takeoff. The private pilot and a passenger received serious injuries. Visual conditions prevailed at the time.According to the pilot, during takeoff, the airplane would not gain altitude and started clipping the tops of trees off the end of the runway. The pilot pulled back on the yoke and stalled the airplane. The airplane collided with an embankment and came to rest in a creek. The airplane impacted the creek in a near-vertical nose-down attitude.