Risk Management

Some pilots are, by nature, worriers. They worry about fuel, about engine failures, about hazardous weather, about midair collisions. Bluntly, pilots worry about things that can kill them. But do they worry about the right things? In other words, does the risk framework that most of us construct in our personal aviation universe reflect the reality of the serious killers in aircraft accidents? Our guess is that it does not, unless pilots are out there really sweating about stalls, spins and controlled flight into terrain. And even if the pilot population is wide awake about these hazards, it could do a better job of avoiding them. Stalls and CFIT (controlled flight into terrain) pop up as the two biggies in fatal accidents in general aviation to a degree that, frankly, startles us.

Anyone whos spent much time flying personal aircraft has been asked this question: Is it safe? As a rule, the answer is, “It depends.” Because safety is relative, sitting at home can be the safest course of action. But its usually not very rewarding, and sitting at home makes it much more difficult to travel in a personal aircraft. Beginning on page 24 of this issue, we look at a recent accident the NTSB attributed to low-level maneuvering. In critiquing that accident, we referred to the AOPA Air Safety Foundation (AOPA/ASF) and its most recent Nall Report, an annual in-depth look at GA accident trends. The data in those annual reports is very intriguing; so much so, we thought wed examine some of it more closely. We wanted to pose the question, “Is it safe to do X?” when X is some operation, maneuver or decision made by a GA pilot. While every operation and skill level is different, what we really wanted to do is highlight some of the areas in which GA pilots routinely bend metal, with the idea of using the 2007 Nall Report, the most recent available, and its findings to demonstrate why doing what youre about to do might not be a good idea.

In last months Editors Log, under the heading, “Unwritten Rules,” we discussed the tragic August 8, 2009, mid-air collision between a Piper PA-32R-300 and Eurocopter AS350 operating as a for-hire tour over the Hudson River off New York City. The Piper had just departed nearby Teterboro Airport while the helicopter had launched a few moments before from the West 30th Street Heliport. The two collided over the Hudson Rivers west bank; all nine aboard both aircraft perished. The collision engendered just the kind of hysteria to which those who pay attention to the mass medias coverage of general aviation have grown accustomed. Elected officials and average citizens alike marched forth to complain there were no rules concerning such operations, and non-scheduled flights should be (choose one or all) banned, subject to specific training and approvals or under new operating rules, including positive ATC direction.

There are times when every pilot wishes. Wishes the weather was better; wishes the airplane was newer; wishes it was better equipped and wishes that he hadnt promised passengers they would be home on time. And thats usually the way it begins. Wishful thinking for weather-involved flight, in marginal VFR conditions. Fog, rain and low ceilings are important causes of weather-related general aviation accidents. These accidents can be further broken down; inadequate preflight planning and preparation make up a large percentage. Trying to fly VFR in IFR weather is another. Major risks are those pilots who operate beyond their ability, beyond their IFR currency and beyond their experience levels in IFR.

On a recent foggy morning in Hagerstown, Md., I sat waiting for the visibility to improve enough for me to depart on a Part 135 passenger flight. Every airport in the region was socked in with less than a quarter mile visibility, when a somewhat agitated passenger came up to me and asked what we were waiting for. I explained that the visibility had to improve before we would be legal to depart. In an incredibly ill-timed coincidence, we heard the sound of a single-engine piston departing from somewhere in the cloud outside the door, and my passenger snidely inquired why that plane could leave, but we couldnt. I felt like I had been asked to explain Bernoullis principle to a five-year-old. It was a deceptively complicated question, and one that should be of interest to pilots flying in their own aircraft under FAR Part 91.

If you take a big look at the general weather patterns across the entire contiguous U.S., youll see a rather marked difference. The eastern U.S. from about the Mississippi River to the Atlantic has a pattern that is often the least flexible, with adverse weather that can be frustratingly stable. Weather not very friendly to airplanes can persist there for days. Still, though, the worst weather-i.e., convective activity-is usually transient. Next is the area from the Mississippi to the Rockies. This area can get some rather severe weather, too, but the worst of it usually doesnt last long. While you may have to avoid the thunderstorms, tornadoes, ice storms, etc., an early start or short delay will usually make the difference between “dont-go-there” weather and reasonable VMC. Of course, like anywhere, it can still have its periods of low IMC that just hang there with no hope of a quick reprieve. The next area that we can generalize is from the Rockies all the way to the Pacific coast. Here, other than predictable isolated cells or cell clusters, severe weather is far less common. Indeed, other than the infamous coastal fog layers that can last for weeks, the weather in the West is seldom even IMC for more than a few hours at a time.

Every year, takeoffs and landings account for over half the pilot-related accidents, according to the AOPA Air Safety Foundation. While poor technique accounts for some of them, many accidents could have been prevented if the pilot had consulted available documentation to determine the airplanes performance. But before any of that can happen, we need to ensure we know how to evaluate current conditions. To assist students in determining performance data, I have them use a takeoff and landing data card on which is all the information a pilot should need to evaluate takeoff and landing performance. The card is also useful for instructors who are in the position of flying multiple aircraft models or versions. As an example, in a recent period I flew four different versions of Cessna 172s (one with the airspeed in MPH, another in knots, a third with the 180-HP STC and still different V-speeds; the fourth was a Thielert diesel conversion-you get the idea). Keeping the numbers straight for these and other different airplanes can be a challenge without a reference card. Lets look at whats important to evaluate, and how to go about assembling your own data card. The first item is to evaluate weight and balance, factors directly affecting any aircrafts performance. That an overloaded airplanes performance will decrease as its fuel consumption increases should not be news to any pilot. Too, one loaded outside its center of gravity (CG) range will handle differently, and will likely be dangerously unstable. In either case, the plane will not perform in a predictable manner and the pilot is in uncharted, dangerous waters. Step one is to get the aircrafts empty weight and moment. This sounds simple and straightforward, but I have seen incorrect aircraft weight sheets in logbooks. When I went back and checked the maintenance logs, I found a difference of over 200 pounds. Airplanes of the same make and model do not weigh the same. Dont forget basic empty weight consists of the aircraft, unusable fuel and oil.

One of the sad realities of general aviation becomes apparent upon reading a score or so NTSB accident reports: While true in-flight emergencies are rare, pilots who do not fly for a living have a less-than-stellar record of success when they stare one in the face. It is a blunt corollary to the simple fact that anything a human doesnt practice regularly doesnt get done well the next time its needed. Thats why pilots who take recurrent training every six months tend to have far, far fewer accidents than pilots who only grudgingly take a flight review every 24. No matter how we try to sweep the mess under the rug, skills atrophy fast and anything we dont practice regularly we, sadly, screw up. Those who study human behavior have long been telling us this stuff, they just use bigger words. We know it. We know perfectly well that if we are faced with an emergency when we go flying tomorrow that how we handle it has already been determined. If weve thought about that particular emergency (or one very similar) and how we will deal with it, the odds of handling it correctly are astronomically higher than if we havent given it any thought. If weve actually rehearsed dealing with the emergency in the last six months, the odds that well deal with it correctly go way, way up. Being human, we do well what we do often. We do landings all the time. We dont do fires in flight nearly as frequently.

Every pilot, to one degree or another, spends time contemplating risk management. While aviation is known to be potentially risky, most aviators adopt the strategy of actively managing risk as a means of minimizing the exposure to danger. Each and every flight involves a series of choices and judgments, either conscious or not, that ideally insures the safe completion of the flight. Outside the cockpit, we spend a significant portion of time reading accident reports, attending safety seminars or even going through the new FARs. Virtually every aspect of flight safety is scrutinized. I say “virtually” since there is one area which is generally given very little consideration. That is what happens on the ramp. How safe (or dangerous) is it to be in the vicinity of an airport ramp? It is exceedingly difficult to derive a useful statistical comparison (like fatalities per 100,000 flight hours) since there is a broad spectrum in ramp activities; from a sleepy grass strip where hand-propping might be the greatest danger, to a large metropolitan airport where the intensity of activity can appear to create a blur. The risks and frequency of events are likely to be completely different across the spectrum of airports. However, knowing what has happened to other pilots and operators might make you pause to think next time you walk across the apron while talking on your cellphone or glancing at the likely departure procedure. Instead, we need to recognize the hazards of being in an area where bad things can and do happen, and then look at the ramp in different way.

The phrases “all weather” and “single-engine airplane” belong in the same sentence only for a select few pilots whose tolerance for risk is best described as elastic. What has always been true, remains true: One mans routine trip through cold clouds is another mans (or womans) agita-inducing nightmare. Of late, the industry has made remarkable strides in giving even the most risk-tolerant pilots better tools to detect threatening weather and deal with its consequences. Still, even for many experienced pilots, structural icing represents an exceptional terror. Ice forecasting has improved-even in the last five years-but intensity forecasting is still uncertain at best. And many pilots worry-irrationally in our view-about the FAA-legal definition of known icing. When is it legal to depart? When is it not? Do so-called inadvertent ice protection systems really buy you any risk mitigation? (Short answer: yes.) For some pilots, worrying about these fine details leads to distracting hand wringing. It really shouldnt. Seeing an opportunity in this conundrum, Cirrus Aircraft (formerly Cirrus Design) recently developed and will soon certify and ship what is, in our view, the most sophisticated and possibly effective integrated approach to ice protection for any single-engine piston airplane weve seen. And thats saying a lot, given the excellent TKS-based known-ice package that Mooney has offered for years, not to mention inadvertent and certified systems for Beechcraft and Cessna models, including the composite Bend, Oregon-built Corvallis line. Prior to Cessna buying the then-Columbia Aircraft Company, Columbia had dabbled in electric ice protection systems, but without much success. TKS is now the market leader in new aircraft de-icing systems. By way of definition, “inadvertent” means a system is designed to provide some margin of protection without being certified for flight into known ice.