The Board often acts as though a sufficient number of probabilities constitute evidence. In this case it worked backward from the copilot’s inexplicable error to identify noise, G-loads and time pressure as reasons for the mistake. This is sheer speculation, and it’s unexpected that a professional test pilot of suborbital rocket vehicles would be so easily rattled. In fact, the report undermines its own conclusion, stating elsewhere that cockpit video shows little vibration; that there would have been ample time, around 20 seconds, between the firing of the rocket motor and the arrival of Mach 1.4; and that the combined longitudinal and vertical G-loads at the time added up to less than four. Both pilots had rehearsed the flight more than 100 times in the simulator, both had made previous powered flights in the rocket plane (although the copilot’s single powered flight had been more than a year earlier), and both had had acrobatic training flights in an Extra 300 to hone their G-tolerance. According to a close friend of the copilot, he was not feeling anxiety about the flight and was in fact looking forward to it. The only evidence that the copilot was overwhelmed by the cockpit environment is the fact that he made the mistake. The reasoning seems circular.