Aviation Safety

During normal inspection of the right magneto of a Lycoming IO-540-AB1A5 installed on a Cessna 182T, the distributor brush was found badly worn. Wear is exactly as described in SB3-08, although more extreme, and magneto s/n and manufacturing date are outside the SBs applicability range. The other magneto exhibited more extreme wear signs and also was unaffected by the SB.

In August 8, 2009, a Piper PA-32R-300 Lance and a Eurocopter AS350BA collided over the Hudson River between New Jersey and Manhattan. The pilot and two passengers aboard the airplane, and the pilot and five passengers aboard the air-tour helicopter were killed. Both aircraft were substantially damaged. On September 14, 2010, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) held a public hearing to approve its probable cause finding. The NTSB determined “the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept…made it difficult for the airplane pilot to see the helicopter until the final seconds before the collision.” The NTSB also found fault with a Teterboro Airport (TEB) tower controller, who was on a personal telephone call as the Piper departed the facility.

Unless our flights purpose is training or flying for recreation, were usually trying to get somewhere for a reason. Were on a mission, so to speak, and have the goal of getting from Point A to Point B as quickly and efficiently as possible. Unfortunately, we sometimes omit “as safely as possible” from that list. Its human nature to have a goal for most of our activities, something pilots often express in the form or a flight plan. Events, conditions or fate can conspire against our ability to meet those goals, however. Examples include mechanical, physiological or meteorological obstacles.

November 12345, youre cleared from the Backwoods Airport to the Backwoods NDB, then hold as published. Climb and maintain 3000 feet, squawk 2012. Report airborne on frequency 125.1. Clearance void if not off by two-zero past the hour; time now zero-five past the hour. Expect further clearance at two-five past the hour.” Fly IFR from non-towered, out-of-the-way airport, and youll eventually get a short-range clearance like the one above. Its a clearance to a nearby fix with a time window (until the “void time”) allowing you to enter controlled airspace without conflicting with other IFR airplanes. Since ATC cant see you on radar yet and wont know exactly when youll enter controlled airspace from that non-towered field, theyll keep a small area clear for you until the void time

A recent spate of high-profile runway excursions involving airline operations got me thinking: Runway overruns are not a topic on which the average GA pilot receives much comprehensive instruction during flight training. The pros have operational policies providing the parameters and protocols by which takeoffs and landings must be done each and every time. But for the rest of us not flying the big iron in conformity to op specs, theres no similar, systematic defense strategy utilized against running into the ditch. In fact, the varied nature of GA flying itself-sporadic flights, from local VFR practice to an IFR cross-country-actually presents a greater challenge than that done by the pros flying the same bus route day in and day out.

Pilots like to talk about speed and how fast they fly, often to the exclusion of other aircraft characteristics; its fun to go fast, no doubt. Witness how many aviators seek out the fastest flivver their finances can support. But the ability to power up to cruise, trim for speed, engage the autopilot and start fiddling with an iPod requires far less skill and hand-flying ability than working at the lower end of the airspeed dial. And we dont learn much at the top of the green. Demonstrating slow-flying skills takes up part of our training time; slow flying is an item in the FAAs Practical Test Standards for sport pilot certificates on up.

Todays typical flight training curricula are largely maneuver-based, with little emphasis on higher order pilot skills, especially risk management. At its heart, the typical curriculum is designed to train a pilot to pass the practical test for the certificate or rating he or she seeks. A rare curriculum includes training to identify, assess and mitigate risk. In previous articles, Ive asserted the root cause of many accidents-and perhaps most fatal accidents-is poor risk management (Aviation Safety, July 2010, “TAA Training”). I also postulated better risk management training, especially in risk mitigation, could be an effective way to reduce these accidents (Aviation Safety, September 2010, “Train to Mitigate Risk”).

We spend a lot of time and space here fretting about training. In this issue, for example, regular contributor Bob Wright discusses the need for and obstacles to better integration into our training infrastructure of risk management concepts. Similarly, were always writing about getting with an instructor and practicing various maneuvers or procedures. But none of this is easy, nor inexpensive.Weve also railed from time to time about what Ill call the “FBO experience.” Too often, when a well-off prospective student and airplane owner drives his or her luxury SUV out to the airport to inquire about flying lessons, they are greeted in a dingy, poorly lit building by an uninformed employee who shrugs, saying, “Our flight instructor is up with a student.”

I just got around to reading the July 2010 issues “Yaw Adversity.” I never write to magazines, but Mark Hutchins response to Tom Turners article made me grab my “pen.” In response, I would argue rudder is a primary and aileron is a secondary yaw-correcting control. Most pilots never experience crosswind landings in a plane that really cares, like a Cub, Taylorcraft or Citabria. In such a plane, in a crosswind on takeoff or short final, I wouldnt advise the pilot to focus on secondary correction effects to put the nose where they want it.

At about 0215 Eastern time, the airplane was substantially damaged when it impacted trees while making a forced landing following a loss of engine power during cruise. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. Visual conditions prevailed and an IFR flight plan was filed. According to preliminary ATC information, during cruise flight at 7000 feet msl, the pilot reported a loss of engine power. He was then radar vectored by ATC towards the closest airport. Approximately three nautical miles southeast of the divert airport, radar contact was lost as the airplane descended below the radar coverage area.