Aviation Safety

Everybody talks about crosswind practice, but few pilots do anything about it. Crosswinds are the number one factor in weather-related accidents, and even far more in-motion aviation insurance claims. The answer to handling crosswinds is usually to…practice crosswinds. Theres no question that practice makes one (at least closer to) perfect. And, as is the case with most other maneuvers we attempt when flying aircraft, landing in crosswinds requires the artful combination of a number of individual skills. As with so many elements of learning to fly and maintaining proficiency, there are several of ways to develop and improve your crosswind skills. You dont necessarily have to practice them in an actual crosswind, but you do need to be ready to combine them on the day when things are strong and gusty, and not aligned with the runway. Here are five exercises you and your CFI can use to develop better crosswind landing skills.

In March, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released a brief statement stating the results of a study it conducted into the relative safety of general aviation airplanes equipped with glass-panel technologies. As we reported in our April issue, the NTSB concluded the last decades glass-cockpit revolution has not resulted in enhanced safety for the period and aircraft it studied. It came to such a conclusion, in part, because it found single-engine airplanes manufactured between 2002 and 2006 and equipped with glass cockpits had a higher fatal accident rate than similar aircraft with conventional instruments. At that time, very little else was known about the study, including the specific aircraft models involved, its methodology and other metrics, raising many questions. Since our April issue was finalized, the NTSB has released the full 91-page study results, including a separate seven-page letter detailing a series of recommendations to the FAA. These documents may be retrieved from the NTSB Web site using links published in the box in the upper right corner of the opposite page.

Years ago, when I was still just a student trying to figure out a Cessna 150, I managed to convince a CFI to sign me off for soloing a Cherokee 140. It was bigger, had a low wing (not that theres anything wrong with that) and four seats. At the time, it seemed like a 727. At this point in my training, I also had been signed off for solo flights to and from a couple of nearby non-towered airports.Soon, I decided to go fly the thing around the local area. Hearing this, the FBO asked me to visit one of those nearby airports to drop off some small items. I willingly agreed, loaded the stuff and launched uneventfully. Soon, as I cruised toward my destination, it dawned on me: I had never landed a 727/Cherokee 140 by myself. Since Im still around to write about it, its obvious it all worked out. I remembered my training, ran the checklist and spent most of my time in the pattern ensuring the airplane was ready to land. Would that we all paid as much attention to readying the airplane to land as we do simply moving various switches and levers.

It was a trip in its conceptual stages from the time I began taking flight lessons: Winchester, Va., to the lowlands of Lawrenceville, Va., where my grandparents reside. Almost four months after obtaining my private pilot certificate-upgrading from a recreational-I had the chance to make the journey. My wife and I, plus our two children, would fly down the upcoming Saturday for the weekend

In early April, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released its preliminary 2009 aviation accident statistics. There is good news in the NTSBs numbers, which “show an overall decrease in U. S. civil aviation accidents.” Most of the good news belongs to those engaged in on-demand operations under Part 135, which achieved the lowest number of accidents and fatal accidents the industry segment has enjoyed in two decades. Hats off to them. But that good news is tempered once again (see “One,” in our May 2009 issue) by a dismal showing among Part 91 operators. And Part 121, scheduled, operators would have had a perfect year except for the February 12, 2009, crash of a Colgan Air Bombardier DHC-8-400 operating as Continental Connection Flight 3407 outside Buffalo, N.Y., which killed 50.

Inspection of a recent engine installation uncovered a fractured engine-mount bolt. After informing the STC holder of the failure, we were told we should have re-torqued these bolts after 25 hours of operation. This information was not included in the STC. The submitter believes the STC is inadequate in ensuring continued airworthiness.

First of all, “Playing Mental Defense” (March 2010) was an excellent article. I would like to offer clarification on a key technical point, however. Mr. Pestal correctly identifies “cognitive dissonance” as the condition of psychological discomfort experienced when competing cognitions occur. He also correctly described the human tendency to attempt to resolve the cognitive dissonance by utilizing denial, rationalization and other unproductive defense mechanisms as we seek to return to a state of psychological comfort. We in psychology refer to this process as “dissonance reduction” or “dissonance resolution.”

At about 1500 Mountain time, the airplane experienced an in-flight fire. The commercial pilot and passenger were not injured. The airplane was destroyed by a post-crash fire. Visual conditions prevailed. About 30 minutes into the flight, at 9500 feet msl, the pilot smelled fuel. A few seconds later the smell became “overwhelming” and was accompanied by a sensation of deceleration.

At about 1145 Central time, the airplane was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain while on an IFR approach. The instrument-rated private pilot, a private pilot-rated passenger and two other passengers were fatally injured. Visual conditions prevailed at the destination airport at the time of the accident. Preliminary radar data indicated the airplane varied altitude and heading outside the final approach fix and impacted terrain 11 miles south of the runways approach end.

The two airplanes collided at 1327 Mountain time shortly after the Piper released a Schweizer SGS 2-32 glider. Visual conditions prevailed. The commercial pilot aboard the Piper and the private pilot and passenger aboard the Cirrus were fatally injured. The commercial pilot and two passengers aboard the Schweizer were not injured.