The eleven U.S. states scheduled to host matches during the FIFA World Cup this summer may be the first to exercise newly granted authority to jam, intercept, and take down uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS), or drones.
During past World Cups, stadium security teams focused primarily on stopping pitch invaders and other threats on the ground. Now, they are paying more attention to the airspace above and around stadiums, which in the U.S. has become increasingly vulnerable as more drones take to the skies.
During a counter-UAS (C-UAS) summit in December, the Washington National Guard simulated a drone attack on Seattle’s Lumen Field—a World Cup host venue—in anticipation that one could actually take place.
To address that contingency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on Tuesday awarded $250 million to help state and local law enforcement detect, identify, track, and mitigate UAS. The money comes from FEMA’s $500 million Counter-UAS Grant Program, established in July by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act.
The initial tranche of funding is reserved for World Cup host states, as well as the National Capital Region, which will host the America250 celebration in July. The remaining $250 million will become available to all U.S. states and territories in fiscal year 2027.
“We knew we needed to act quickly to keep the World Cup safe from the rising threat of unmanned aircraft systems, and that’s exactly what we did,” said Karen Evans, acting FEMA administrator. “This is the fastest non-disaster grant program ever executed by FEMA with funds being awarded just 25 days after the application deadline.”
About $28 million of the initial tranche of $250 million was awarded to Washington, D.C., on behalf of the National Capital Region. The rest was allocated as follows:
- $34.6 million to California
- $30.3 million to Texas
- $23.6 million to Florida
- $21.9 million to Massachusetts
- $21.8 million to New Jersey
- $20.3 million to Georgia
- $19.5 million to Washington state
- $17.7 million to New York
- $14.2 million to Missouri
- $12.5 million to Pennsylvania
- $5.3 million to Kansas
To receive funding for UAS mitigation capabilities, states were required to send law enforcement and correctional personnel for training at the FBI’s National C-UAS Training Center (NCUTC), created in June by a White House executive order.
The order directed the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces—which secure large public gatherings such as the Super Bowl—to integrate C-UAS capabilities. It also accelerated a federal safety review of foreign UAS and their components, which prompted the Federal Communications Commission to enact a total ban on new sales of those products in December.
The latter move was welcomed by American drone manufacturers but met with concern by drone pilots, many of whom rely on products from China’s DJI. In 2020, the company’s share of the U.S. market was estimated at 77 percent among hobbyists and as high as 90 percent among public safety agencies.
Drone Disruptions
As of November 2025, the FAA has registered more than 830,000 drones and certified more than 480,000 remote pilots. Both figures have risen exponentially since Part 107 regulations for small UAS took effect in 2016. They could continue to grow with the looming introduction of Part 108, which covers operations beyond the visual line of sight (BVLOS) of the operator.
The U.S. military deploys UAS in combat, and commercial operators use them to deliver food, equipment, and medical supplies. But they are also used for purposes the government considers nefarious, such as smuggling contraband into prisons or surveilling sensitive infrastructure. In January officials said unidentified drones were spotted over military installations.
The FAA uses temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) to keep recreational and commercial drones away from crowds. At stadiums, these TFRs typically bar them from flying below 3,000 feet and 3 nm from the venue within one hour of an event’s scheduled start and end time. Larger events, such as the Super Bowl and December’s Army-Navy college football game, have added restrictions.
The FAA’s publicly accessible Sporting Event Automated Monitoring System (SEAMS) tells pilots when and where TFRs are in place. It is updated with weather delays, cancellations, overtime periods, and other data from the NFL, MLB, and other professional sports leagues.
Still, thousands of drones slip through the cracks each year. Cathy Lanier, the NFL’s chief of security, testified to Congress in December 2024 that the league recorded 2,845 drone incursions into the TFRs around its stadiums during its 2023 season. That figure was 2,527 the season prior.
“Our national security and intelligence agencies continue to warn that terrorist groups and other bad non-state actors consider stadiums and other mass gatherings attractive targets for attack,” Lanier said. “In fact, earlier this year, Islamic State propaganda specifically encouraged attacks on stadiums, including referencing the Paris Summer Olympics.”
State and local law enforcement can respond to drone incidents and arrest pilots. But until December, they relied on federal authorities—which are present only for major events—to jam, intercept, or take down the UAS. Lanier in a 2023 interview said that of 121,000 requests for FBI or DHS counter-drone support to stadiums and other venues since 2018, only 77 were approved.
That changed last month with the introduction of the Safer Skies Act, part of the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. It extends drone mitigation authority to state, local, territorial, and tribal agencies, which will be trained by the FBI. They will use technologies—including radio frequency and detection, tracking, and identification systems—from a list maintained by the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Defense, Transportation, and other agencies.
The typical C-UAS protocol is for authorities to contact the drone’s pilot and persuade them to land. If that fails, they can take an array of actions, from shooting the drone down to catching it with a net.
The World Cup presents a massive stage for bad actors to disrupt proceedings. It could also be an opportunity for authorities to determine how effective their C-UAS capabilities really are.
