Editor’s Log

Beech Model 65 Queen AirFailed Gear Limit SwitchLanding gear limit switch (p/n MS250261) failed to stop motor during retraction, causing landing gear circuit breaker to pop. Aircraft landed without incident. Re-rigged the switch IAW maintenance manual. Retraction test and ops check okay.Part total time: Unknown

My Debonair had to go to the avionics shop recently for its 24-month pitot/static and transponder checks, and to diagnose an autopilot that wouldnt. As I feared, autopilot system components had to go out for factory attention, and the removal work would take longer than my schedule allowed. So I left the airplane and Uberd home. Before I had the free time to retrieve the airplane, my part of Florida was seeing a constant flow of moisture and showers coming in from the Gulf of Mexico.

This sounds like malpractice on the part of his FBO and possibly flight instructor. How can a student pilot in primary training with about 20 hours get checked out in a different aircraft with that little training? I remember that being approved for solo flight in my FBOs 172 was a big deal, like it is for most students: you do some landings with the instructor, then he or she gets out and tells you to do it yourself while observing from the ground, something that apparently didnt occur in this case since the instructor was with him for that sole hour of dual. Im even wondering how the students insurance company would have covered him (or if he was covered at all…).

My flight instructor also lives in an airpark development, about 40 nm away, an easy hop. When we fly together, I generally taxi directly to her home. Past palm and pine trees, mailboxes, fences and…well, you get the idea. (Her trash gets collected on Fridays.) So Im no stranger to ground operations in close quarters. It could be said that I dont really know what to do with all the expansive, unobstructed pavement available for taxiing at real airports. Thats not to say Ill never taxi into something; thats always a risk.

Over the years, Ive spent way too much time as self-loading cargo on airliners. Regardless, Im always curious about whats going on in the front office but rarely get a clear glimpse. One exception is when some last-minute maintenance is performed or connection problems result in some passengers arriving late to the gate. Invariably, Captain Speaking will come on the PA and apologize for the delay, commenting that well be ready to go as soon as we get the final paperwork. What is the captain talking about?

A year and a half ago, it dawned on me that what I most enjoyed about my previouscareer as a science communications consultant was when I got to commute to visit clients in my faithful Cessna 180. With some 1500 hours in my logbook-accumulated primarily on those business trips-I sent out my rsum to two area commercial operators. In response, I got two job offers. Wow. What a game-changer for me. I jumped into the Part 135 world with both feet and left my previous career behind. Now, with more than a year under my belt flying for money, I have been reflecting on how profoundly the move from Part 91 to Part 135 has affected my risk management experiences and choices.

Pilot disconnected the (S-Tec 50) autopilot and hand-flew for several minutes. Shortly after initiating a descent to land, the ailerons began to seize. It took five to 10 seconds to lose aileron authority, followed by elevator authority. Pilot forced to make emergency landing with only a few degrees of operable aileron and elevator, but landed without damage or injury. Examination revealed the autopilot had re-engaged and the servo clutches had frozen.

An aircraft accident would seem like an easy thing to identify: Look for the smoking crater with a few pieces of empennage sticking out, right? Okay, that one probably qualifies. But the national statistics are derived from a very specific definition of accident thats not based on either the events immediate effects on airworthiness or the projected cost of repairs. Airplanes can be and often are scrapped for damage that would cost more to fix than their hulls are worth but still doesnt qualify as substantial enough to merit reporting. Conversely, damage that does qualify sometimes goes unnoticed by the pilots who inflicted it, only to be discovered on a later pre-flight inspection.

People wouldnt fly personal aircraft-or participate in many other activities-if there werent benefits. Thats human nature. Some benefits we seek by taking risks are intangible and hard to quantify. Others can be readily identified and weighted. Its a calculus we all employ daily in mundane ways. However, the problem isnt that we fail to assess benefits when we analyze risk. Instead, the issue is the inaccurate values we assign on both sides of the equation.

Less than a month after the April 4, 2018, fatal crash of a Piper Arrow during a commercial-pilot checkride, the FAA has changed its policy to no longer require a complex airplane (one with controllable-pitch propeller, flaps and retractable landing gear) for the commercial pilot-airplane or flight instructor-airplane certificates. The change comes via FAA Notice 8900.463,Use of a Complex Airplane During a Commercial Pilot or Flight Instructor Practical Test, dated April 24, 2018. The policy change reflects the lack of suitable aircraft.