![The investigation suggested it was a crew fault, with the FAA and maintenance personnel suggesting we hadn’t sumped the fuel to check for water. ...This was not true. [Image: Joel Kimmel]](https://flyingmag1.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/09/FLY0925_1.7-ILAFFT.jpeg?width=655&height=660)
The incident occurred in November 2023 during Florida’s hurricane season, a time known for storms and heavy rain that can last days or even weeks.
After a week of rain, our flight school resumed operations. As a Part 141 school, we follow comprehensive safety practices and procedures manual for how pilots must conduct preflight checks. These emphasize the importance of following checklists and carefully reviewing the aircraft’s POH.
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As the assistant chief instructor with around 1,500 hours of dual instruction and several years of experience, I was well aware not just of our school’s specific procedures but also of general Part 91 operations in GA.
Following the rains, a flight instructor candidate and I had an early morning flight scheduled at around 7 a.m. in a Cessna 152. The weather was beautiful—a warm and sunny Florida morning. Our airplane and the ramp were still wet from the previous night’s heavy rainfall. The CFI candidate completed his preflight inspection according to the checklist.
One of the critical steps was sumping the fuel to check for contamination. Our aircraft has three drain valves—two on the bottom of the wings and the fuel strainer under the engine. The procedure is for the wing tanks to be sumped first and the belly sump checked last.
Somehow, the instructor candidate drained fuel from the belly sump first and then from the tanks. I paid close attention to that fact, knowing it was possible we could find water in the fuel. The preflight was completed and, with no water found in the fuel, we decided to proceed with the flight.
The flight was straightforward, involving a couple of instrument approaches, visual maneuvers, and different types of landings. We executed one ILS approach and remained in the traffic pattern for takeoffs and landings.
After more than an hour of flight and several landings, during our fourth takeoff the flight instructor candidate was at the controls, and just 50 feet above the runway, the engine started to sputter. The engine rpm dropped from 2,300 to 1,500 in a matter of seconds.
- READ MORE: Relaying One Pilot’s Cautionary Tale
Without time to use the checklist, I took control of the aircraft instinctively and lowered the nose to avoid a stall, but I quickly realized the runway was no longer beneath us—only a grassy area with a small drainage canal filled with water after that week of rain. I made the decision to land on the grass.
We executed a soft-field landing, which went smoothly until I unexpectedly encountered a mound with the drainage canal behind it. We had enough speed to jump over the mound. Fortunately, my flying skills helped me avoid a stall, and we eventually landed and came to a stop on the grass. The engine was shut down, and fortunately, there was no damage or fire.
The control tower was already aware of our emergency situation, and airport operations, fire rescue, and news crews were on their way as part of the regular procedure for any emergency landing.
Our school’s maintenance inspector arrived. The first thing he did was check the fuel in the strainer, and to our shock, he drained half a cup of water out of the sump. None of us expected to see water in the tanks or the fuel strainer.
The investigation suggested it was a crew fault, with the FAA and maintenance personnel suggesting we hadn’t sumped the fuel to check for water. However, this was not true, and we provided statements and video evidence from the school’s cameras.
What mattered most was understanding how water accumulated in the fuel strainer after it had been drained. We concluded that as the instructor candidate drained the strainer first, water slowly returned from the tanks through the fuel system back to the strainer, particularly during the flight’s climbs and descents.
This served as a crucial ILAFFT lesson about ensuring that the fuel system is completely free of water and the importance of meticulously following checklist procedures and adhering to the POH.
This column first appeared in the September Issue 962 of the FLYING print edition.
