Accident Probes

Theres no question in my mind that a good autopilot system tends to dull a pilot to what the airplane is doing and what it may be telling him or her. Im fortunate to have a really good one in my traveling airplane and use it most of the time when Im in cruising flight. It will fly a heading, follow a magenta line, climb/descend to a preset altitude at a rate of my choosing and shoot coupled ILS or GPS approaches.

The pilot later related he was in cruise climb at about 8500 feet msl when he noticed something in his peripheral vision, then felt a thud as something struck the airplane. There was no loss of control or abnormal control feel, so he continued the flight and landed uneventfully. Upon landing, about 12 inches of the airplanes vertical stabilizer was missing; there also was substantial damage to the rudder. Initial examination showed no evidence of organic material. A detailed examination by the NTSB is pending.

In the spring of 1984, I was 23 and a new pilot, with barely 120 hours. While planning a trip that would include my wife and another couple, I called the FBO to ask about the amount of fuel burn on the Piper Warrior I had rented for the flight. I was advised the Warrior burns eight gph in cruise at 9500 feet msl and, with that information, I completed my flight planning and we all met at the airport.

Readers likely are familiar with the role product liability plays in general aviations history. It shares responsibility for the industrys collapse in the 1980s and it wasnt until federal legislation was enacted-the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, which limited manufacturer liability-that some piston-engine airplane production was restarted. Separately, patterns were identified involving accidents of specific aircraft types, and addressing them became another way to minimize the risk of successful liability claims.

One of the first things instrument pilots learn during their training to fly approaches is reading the fine print, the various notes that may accompany a published procedure. Its a classic case of the large print holding great promise while the small print dashes any lingering hopes. Perhaps most ubiquitous is the NoPT admonition that a procedure turn is not authorized when flying to the final approach fix on certain segments.

According to the FAA and its Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, CAMI, between six and 14 percent of pilot fatalities are related to alcohol intoxication. While that seems like a very high number of pilots in our experience-and a wide, inexact statistical range-the agency said it reached its conclusion by analyzing deceased pilots blood and tissue samples after accidents.

If your aircraft model has a type club or owners organization, you may want to join and participate in their training programs and related activities. Many of the name-brand types are well-served by these programs, and their graduates often come away with new and safer insights on how to operate their aircraft. If your aircraft has unusual handling characteristics-or if you just want to be able to take full advantage of its performance-obtaining specialized instruction from an instructor or training center with experience in that model should be a no-brainer.

Veteran pilots know better, because theyve learned that stalls are a normal part of flying, neither an aberration nor abnormal. They realize and understand stalls are simply what happens at the lowest end of an aircrafts normal flight envelope. Stalls when not wanted, not needed, at the wrong time, wrong place bend airplanes and break people. Which brings us to the first and most-important rule to remember about stalls: A stall can occur at any airspeed, in any attitude and at any power setting, from dead engine through full power.

While there are differing statistics regarding causes of aircraft fire-related accidents, it is safe to say that aircraft maintenance and pre-flight actions by the pilot play a significant role in most such events. And since the chances of surviving an in-flight fire without major injury or death are poor, preventing a fire from occurring in the first place should be Job One. Pilots can memorize procedures, talk about scenarios and what-ifs, but when it is all said and done, avoiding one starts on the ground.

The flight instructor set the airplane up for simulated engine failure by pulling out the carburetor heat control and reducing throttle to 1200 rpm. The student pilot followed emergency procedures, used the checklist and prepared to land. After the carburetor heat control was pushed back in and the throttle advanced, there was a sudden loss of power; efforts to restart the engine were unsuccessful. The airplane collided with the fence during the landing.