On July 26, 2024, about 1:04 p.m. MDT, a Pilatus PC-12/47E was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Recluse, Wyoming. The pilot and six passengers were killed.
Before the crash, the pilot reported to Salt Lake City Center the loss of the autopilot and declared an emergency. The pilot then advised he was trying to get control of the airplane, and the controller asked if he needed additional assistance. There was no further response from the pilot.
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On May 5, about 8:54 a.m. EDT, a 690A Aero Commander was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Palmyra, Virginia. The pilot and passenger died.
According to preliminary information obtained from the FAA, the airplane was in cruise at 20,000 feet when it reversed course. The controller queried the pilot, who replied, “We have lost…We need to climb.” When the controller asked the pilot, “What is your issue?” the pilot responded, “We have lost autopilot.” There was no further communication from the airplane.
It’s easy to jump on pilots and wonder how they could lose control of an airplane simply because the autopilot disconnected. But a recent incident I experienced while working with a new Vision Jet owner left me more sympathetic toward these pilots and provided a better understanding of how these situations can creep up.
I was working with a pilot who had completed two weeks of SF50 training at the Cirrus Vision Center in Knoxville, Tennessee. The pilot was now type rated in the SF50, but because it was done in a simulator, they still needed 25 hours of supervised operating experience (SOE) in an aircraft before flying solo.
Legally, the pilot was PIC, and I was riding in the right seat to help them develop experience and confidence in the jet.
Providing that experience is a delicate balance. Rather than teaching pilots what to do in the jet, I let them take the lead and don’t immediately rush to fix things for them when mistakes are made. I believe pilots are more likely to remember things when I let them get deeper into an issue rather than correct it for them at the onset.
That was demonstrated to me years ago by a CFI who was checking me out in a Diamond DA42 and let me get practically into the flare before saying, “The gear’s up. Go around.” That scared the heck out of me and left a deeper impression than if he had reminded me on downwind that I’d forgotten to lower the gear.
Our incident in the Vision Jet occurred while flying the ILS Z Runway 19 approach into Jackson, Wyoming (KJAC), which is a favorite airport of mine with its scenic mountains, meadows, and streams along the way.
We were approaching the IAF at MOSSS and just started to pop in and out of the cloud tops when the wheels started coming off the bus. I’d been shooting video with my iPhone but stopped a few seconds after the incident began. It was only by inspecting the video afterward that I figured out how we got into the situation.
At MOSSS, we needed to turn about 50 degrees left to fly to DNW, the Dunoir VOR. As we were crossing MOSSS, the autopilot was inadvertently disconnected when the pilot’s hand brushed across the disconnect button on the side stick.
My first instinct was to turn the autopilot back on, but I held back and let the pilot do it. Seconds later, after I turned off the video, the pilot disconnected the autopilot but left the flight director on and began hand-flying the aircraft. I remember watching the PFD as the pilot closely followed the flight director.
We were surprised when ATC called and said we were off course. We had turned an additional 50 degrees beyond our course, and the flight director was still commanding a left turn. We corrected and rejoined the approach but were confused as to how we got into that situation. Of course, had I been watching the MFD, I would have noticed sooner that we were no longer following the magenta line.
Had I intervened at the onset and turned on the autopilot, I would have remembered to also push the “NAV” and “ALT” buttons, but I didn’t notice that the pilot didn’t. Here’s where a little autopilot knowledge helps a lot.
For most Garmin autopilots, whenever you push the “AP” button, the autopilot turns on in the “ROL” and “PIT” modes. For many autopilots ROL mode means keep the wings level, but for Garmin autopilots it only rolls the wings level if you were banked 6 degrees or less. If you’re banked 6-22 degrees when you press the AP key, ROL mode maintains your current bank angle…forever.
Neither of us noticed the flight director was in ROL mode, and the pilot dutifully followed the continuous left turn it was commanding.
It’s important to remember that all pilots make mistakes. So, an important aspect of flying is having the tools and capacity to recover from mistakes.
The tools are knowing what to do to fix the inevitable surprises that occur when we fly. Capacity is our ability to respond, which can be affected by things like fatigue and sickness. In this case, the pilot had been coughing badly for two days, decreasing their capacity. And when workload exceeds capacity, accidents can occur.
Undoubtedly when the autopilots disconnected in the Pilatus and Aero Commander, the sudden increase in workload exceeded the pilots’ capacity to respond. Whenever we fly, we want to make sure there’s a wide margin between our capacity and the workload, so we can deal with the inevitable surprises.
This column first appeared in the April Issue 957 of the FLYING print edition.
