An examination of the airplane revealed no pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operations. Data recovered from the airplane's Remote Data Module showed that the airplane's anti-ice tank switch was turned on about 7 minutes 30 seconds before the accident and remained on for 1 minute 50 seconds. The switch was then turned off and remained off for the remainder of the flight. The airplane's flaps were extended to the "HALF" position about 2 minutes 50 seconds before the accident. Just before the data ended, the airplane's pitch and bank increased, and the stall warning activated. In the last 3 seconds of data, the airplane's bank angle was 48 to 50 degrees, and the indicated airspeed was between 87 and 90 kts. The Pilot's Operating Handbook for the airplane showed that at 60 degrees of bank with half flaps, the airplane's stall speed was 95 kts. It is possible that, during the approach, ice accumulated on the airplane, which may have increased the airplane's stall speed. However, regardless of whether or not structural ice was present, during the turn to final, the pilot allowed the airspeed to decrease below the airplane's published stall speed. As a result, the wing's critical angle-of-attack was exceeded, and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall and departed controlled flight.