Aviation Safety

At approximately 1420 Central time, the airplane was substantially damaged during a forced landing following a reported loss of engine power during cruise flight. The student pilot and sole occupant was not injured. Visual conditions prevailed. According to an FAA inspector, the aircraft sustained structural damage during the forced landing. The inspector also reported that the flights duration was about 3.2 hours, according to the airplanes Hobbs meter. The airplane came to rest in the inverted position, and the inspector was not able to determine if the airplanes fuel tanks contained fuel.

The airplane was substantially damaged at approximately 1840 Pacific time when it departed the runway during landing roll. The airline transport pilot, airline transport second pilot, and their six passengers were not injured. Visual conditions prevailed. The pilot reported the airplane rotated 90 degrees left after touchdown and continued until the aircraft departed the runway and the nose gear failed. The pilot said he was told that there was three-quarters of an inch of snow on the runway, and the wind was 80 degrees left quarterly at 19, gusting to 29 knots. After landing, he discovered that the runway had 2 inches of slush on it.

At 0722 Eastern time, the airplane was destroyed when it impacted terrain while taking off. The commercial pilot and sole occupant was fatally injured. Visual conditions prevailed. A witness observed the accident airplane in the engine run-up area. The run-up appeared normal; however, the witness noted that the airplanes flaps were extended. After the run-up, the airplane taxied toward the runway with both flaps still extended. After takeoff, the airplanes initial climbout was “normal” until it was 50 to 70 feet in the air. The airplane then entered a “slight” left bank, then made a “steep climb” to 250 to 300 feet. As it climbed, the angle of bank appeared to increase. As the airplane reached the top of its climb, the nose “came down and went straight into the ground.” Upon impact, a postcrash fire ensued.

While on final approach for a 1500-foot private turf strip, the airplane contacted trees, then utility wires and came to rest upright. During the impact, the airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, and the pilot incurred minor injuries. The reported weather at an airport located approximately 19 miles west of the accident site, about the time of the accident, included calm winds, a broken ceiling at 9000 feet, and visibility 10 miles. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions, nor did the pilot report any.

The pilot reported an uneventful runup and normal takeoff. During initial climb, the engine lost power and he initiated a 180-degree turn towards the departure runway due to a lack of suitable terrain for a forced landing. During the forced landing, the airplane struck an airport perimeter fence and subsequently nosed into the ground. A post-accident inspection of the airframe and engine revealed no mechanical anomalies. The reason for the loss of engine power was undetermined.

The airplane sustained substantial damage following a landing gear collapse during the landing roll at 1248 Mountain time. The private pilot was not injured. Visual conditions prevailed. According to the pilot, he approached the airport and attempted to extend the landing gear, which did not extend. He then reset the circuit breaker and extended the gear, confirming with a green light. The airplane touched down and, approximately 50 yards down the runway, the landing gear collapsed. This event was upgraded to an accident after an FAA inspector verified structural damage on the underside of the fuselage.

At 1634 Eastern time, the airplane was destroyed by a post-crash fire after a loss of directional control on landing rollout. Visual conditions prevailed. The private pilot and one passenger reported no injuries. The pilot later stated a gust of wind caused the left wing to come up during the rollout. He applied left aileron but there was no response and the airplane started turning to the right. He lost directional control of the airplane and it came to a stop on the runway. He and his passenger exited the airplane and observed a post-crash fire in the engine compartment. The pilot obtained a fire extinguisher from the airplane but was unable to extinguish the fire.

I recently read an online comment from a wizened aviator to the effect that weather, by itself, has rarely if ever been responsible for an aviation accident. On the other hand, failure of the airplanes crew to correctly fly the airplane in that weather will mean a bad day for everyone aboard just about every time. Since the airplane is an inanimate object capable only of responding within its limitations to what its crew commands, the comment is exactly on-target. One of our challenges as pilots is to bring the required judgment, skill and experience along in the airplane. Of course, the average general aviation airplane is a marvel of reliability and capability. Even when considering an older design, the advances in technology since its introduction make trivial the task of equipping it with the latest in automated systems, allowing its crew to benefit from detailed information and situational awareness only dreamed of a generation ago.

According to the AOPA Air Safety Foundations 2007 Nall Report, you have a 57.4 percent chance of dying if you lose control while maneuvering an airplane, up from 50.5 percent in the reports 2005 edition. Maneuvering describes a host of flight operations including aggressive turns from base to final, confined-area course reversals and retreats to the runway following an engine failure. In other words, turns. Why cant Johnny turn safely? One reason might be losing understanding of and appreciation for the dynamics of a turn, regardless of bank angle, airspeed or pitch. Lets take a look

Its occasionally been said that the real difference between genius and stupidity is that genius knows its limits. And if the discussion involves two flight instructors in the same airplane, the definition of unlimited stupidity stretches out to infinity and beyond. As a new CFI, I had devised this theory about teaching crosswind landings. The best way to do it, according to my theory, was to pick a gusty day, find a crosswind and have at it. Theres nothing original about this; every CFI in the land has practiced it. But I can claim a unique teaching credential: extreme crosswind training. I had been working with another CFI who was training to take the ATP ride. He had more time than I did, but almost all of it was serious military time in Blackhawk helicopters, some in combat. He was a recent convert to fixed-wing flying and, as sometimes seems to be the case with helo pilots, he couldnt grasp the idea of cross controlling to track the runway centerline in a crosswind.