Legal Matters

Squirreled away in a shoe box somewhere, I have a 3 x 5 print (remember those?) of my then-infant son bundled into the back seat of a Cessna 172. It was his first flight, and Im proud to have been the pilot to initiate him, even though he doesnt remember it. I dont have a formal record, but both he and my slightly younger daughter have since logged enough time as my passengers to easily meet the minimum total time required for a private certificate. But before that first flight, his mother and I researched what steps we could take to make it successful.

Expecting that I had somehow unknowingly blown my check ride, we landed, shut everything down and he informed me I had…well…passed! A bit confused but obviously glad I hadnt actually blown it, I accepted the good news not wishing to open my mouth and undo it, and simply thanked him. I never told my instrument instructor what the examiner had said, only that he passed me.

I ts widely accepted that having good situational awareness is vital to safe and efficient flying. But what does situational awareness even mean? How do we develop and maintain the good kind? How do we fit ourselves into the big picture, and why is it important to do so? And once we understand these aspects of situational awareness, how can we use it to make things easier? On three recent flights, I feel I had a high level of situational awareness and used it to make a difference. In one I used my knowledge of my place in the big picture to help another pilot. In the second I used it to help myself. In the third I used it to eliminate a possible delay on an approach. Heres what Im talking about.

According to panelists at a recent Miami, Fla., conference geared to the business jet community and reported by Aviation International News (AIN), not all of the in-service fleet is expected to be compliant by the deadline. (Full disclosure: I often perform freelance work for AIN, for which I am compensated.) In fact, data cited by AIN show compliance is far from universal, with 17.5 percent of the piston-powered general aviation fleet (35,791 of 204,191) currently equipped.

As someone whos researched my share of aviation accident reports over the years, its frustrating to dissect those reports and pick out the various missteps made and the points at which a change in direction, a precautionary landing or other mitigation would have altered the outcome. Loyal readers of this journal understand that aviation accidents arent preordained and, instead, often result from a complex series of events occurring over time. Its often called the accident chain, a term recognizing how these events are linked. Often, individual events occurring in an accident chain, by themselves, would not result in a new accident report. The accident chain concept has great value, but Ive come to think of it as a trajectory instead of a chain.

I was flying my Cessna T210R Turbo Centurion from the Westchester County Airport (KHPN) in White Plains, N.Y., to the Dekalb-Peachtree Airport (KPDK) in Atlanta, Ga., on a dark night. I departed KHPN IFR but encountered unlimited visibility over North Carolina and cancelled. Before takeoff, I observed line personnel fill both fuel tanks. I had planned to have an hours fuel reserve on landing at PDK, and there hadnt been any unforecast headwinds. However, as I passed over Greenville, S.C., at 12,500 feet, both fuel gauges showed the tanks nearly empty.

When the aircraft is equipped with VR-1010-24-1A regulators allowed by Service Instruction 0766-354, Rev II, the overvoltage testing procedure is not achievable. The solid-state voltage regulators are not adjustable to a range (over 31.5v) that will adequately test the overvoltage relays. During a ground run and adjustment of the new voltage regulators, one failed and caused an overvoltage condition. It is this technicians opinion that the test procedure for the overvoltage relay should be changed to include removing and bench testing the overvoltage relays.

Many of todays workplaces seek to create a formalized safety culture, an environment where employees practice behaviors that minimize accidents, look out for their co-workers and where reporting unsafe conditions is encouraged, not subject to retaliation, and frequently rewarded. It can be a great goal, but it often creates an exaggerated sense of safety where people need safety training to use a power strip and posters about how to get out of a car without tripping. The goal of creating a safety culture often ends up a corporate farce, since the best safety cultures are not created by artifice, but happen naturally because people really care.

During a scheduled inspection, technicians encountered corroded and bent control yoke boss attachment hardware that proved difficult to remove. After consulting with the manufacturer, the final recommendation was to remove the boss via cutting the bolts (p/n 2315152-33). Manufacturer was able to repair the yoke assembly using SB 31-27-11 and kit 2381602-801. Aircraft had been parked outside without gust locks.

Over the years, Ive spent way too much time as self-loading cargo on airliners. Regardless, Im always curious about whats going on in the front office but rarely get a clear glimpse. One exception is when some last-minute maintenance is performed or connection problems result in some passengers arriving late to the gate. Invariably, Captain Speaking will come on the PA and apologize for the delay, commenting that well be ready to go as soon as we get the final paperwork. What is the captain talking about?