Aircraft Analysis

Ive owned Cessna T210s since 1977; first a 1969 J model and then a 1979 N model with a TSIO-520-R engine. In the 1980s, there were a number of fuel exhaustion accidents in 210s, all of them attributable to not getting a full fill and resulting in being shorted an hours supply when fueling stops after fuel backs up out of the filler port. The outboard sections of the fuel tanks are slightly higher than the bottom of the filler port. To get the last one-plus gallons in the tanks requires the slowest of fueling until reaching the real full point.

During descent, pilot noted oil streaking back from top engine cowl louvers, then dropping oil pressure. Pilot conducted precautionary shutdown and feathered propeller. Pilot continued descent and landed at destination without issue. Maintenance removed cowling and found oil appearing to come from the turbocharger (p/n 4066109025) area. Further investigation revealed oil bypassing the seals on the turbo.

By now, youve probably heard the news coming out of a recent AOPA Fly-In: The FAA is considering the idea of increasing the maximum takeoff weight limitation for wheel-equipped light sport aircraft (LSA) from 1320 lbs. to as much as 3600 lbs. On its face, this would allow a sport pilot with the appropriate endorsements to serve as pilot in command of, say, a Cirrus SR22 or an A36 Bonanza. Its one narrow focus of a broader initiative dubbed Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certificates, or MOSAIC, which may find its way into forthcoming FAA regulations.

I received a call from the owner of a turbocharged, high-performance single who lives in the Great Lakes region, well-known for icing conditions in late autumn, winter and early spring. His airplane was equipped with an aftermarket TKS-style ice protection system and was not FAA-approved for flight in known icing (FIKI). The pilot wanted to discuss strategies for flight during the cold times of the year, including insights into conditions where icing layers are vertically thin and/or rates of ice accumulation are typically light (or even only a trace).

• Upset Recovery
• Engine Failure Risk
• IFR Takeoff Planning
• Engine MonitoringM
• Trajectories

Experimental amateur-built aircraft in 2017 achieved their safest year ever, according to the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA). The association based its findings on the recently finalized results of the FAAs 2017 General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Survey (GA Survey). Pilots of experimental amateur-built (E-AB) aircraft were involved in fatal accidents at a lower rate than has ever been recorded, with 2.63 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours last year, the association said. That fatal accident rate-2.63-breaks a record set the previous year, when E-AB pilots were involved in 3.6 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours, EAA added.

A witness observed the airplane make a normal landing aligned with the runway centerline. His attention was momentarily diverted and when he looked back, the airplane was established in a gradual left turn, maneuvering at a slow speed in a three-point attitude. The airplane then collided with the airport perimeter fence and came to rest about 600 feet past the touchdown point. The pilot stated that, despite application of brakes and right rudder, the airplane veered off the runway. Damage included the right wing strut.

A pilot-buddy and I were flying two airplanes to the runway at Cape Hatteras, N.C., to spend the day on the beach. Both my rented Cessna 172 and his recently purchased Piper Warrior were loaded with people and gear for the trip, and we both had departed with restricted fuel. Wed hooked up en route at a prearranged time, location and altitude, and were chatting back and forth on the air-to-air frequency. Plan A was to stop in Elizabeth City, N.C., and take on enough fuel for each of us to get back to our respective bases that evening without stopping.

As I gained more experience, including an instrument rating, my weather understanding never really progressed beyond those big three hazards, plus airframe icing as I logged more IMC. It was more a matter of convincing myself I didnt need that additional knowledge-Id already made up my mind that I wasnt going to fly in those conditions-than an outright refusal to learn more. On one of my first forays into IMC as the pilot in command, I learned a hard lesson on cold fronts.

After the usual say again your callsign back and forth, the controller determined there was no flight plan on file. A new voice from the Learjet, probably the captain, asked if he could air-file over the ATC frequency. The controller instead suggested the Lear could file its flight plan over the radio by talking to Flight Service. This is when it got interesting: The Learjet then asked for the Flight Service frequency and a clearance to 17,500 feet. It got even more interesting when ATC suggested calling Flight Service on 122.1 MHz. All of a sudden, here were three blatant examples of poor airmanship and incomplete knowledge.