Aviation Safety

• Upset Recovery
• Engine Failure Risk
• IFR Takeoff Planning
• Engine MonitoringM
• Trajectories

A witness observed the airplane make a normal landing aligned with the runway centerline. His attention was momentarily diverted and when he looked back, the airplane was established in a gradual left turn, maneuvering at a slow speed in a three-point attitude. The airplane then collided with the airport perimeter fence and came to rest about 600 feet past the touchdown point. The pilot stated that, despite application of brakes and right rudder, the airplane veered off the runway. Damage included the right wing strut.

Experimental amateur-built aircraft in 2017 achieved their safest year ever, according to the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA). The association based its findings on the recently finalized results of the FAAs 2017 General Aviation and Part 135 Activity Survey (GA Survey). Pilots of experimental amateur-built (E-AB) aircraft were involved in fatal accidents at a lower rate than has ever been recorded, with 2.63 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours last year, the association said. That fatal accident rate-2.63-breaks a record set the previous year, when E-AB pilots were involved in 3.6 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours, EAA added.

A pilot-buddy and I were flying two airplanes to the runway at Cape Hatteras, N.C., to spend the day on the beach. Both my rented Cessna 172 and his recently purchased Piper Warrior were loaded with people and gear for the trip, and we both had departed with restricted fuel. Wed hooked up en route at a prearranged time, location and altitude, and were chatting back and forth on the air-to-air frequency. Plan A was to stop in Elizabeth City, N.C., and take on enough fuel for each of us to get back to our respective bases that evening without stopping.

As I gained more experience, including an instrument rating, my weather understanding never really progressed beyond those big three hazards, plus airframe icing as I logged more IMC. It was more a matter of convincing myself I didnt need that additional knowledge-Id already made up my mind that I wasnt going to fly in those conditions-than an outright refusal to learn more. On one of my first forays into IMC as the pilot in command, I learned a hard lesson on cold fronts.

Following a scheduled oil and filter change, the technician noted lower-than-normal oil pressure at idle. The new filter (p/n CH48110-1) was replaced and oil pressure indication was normal. Examination of the replaced filter noted some paint chips had been removed in the flange area. The submitter suspects that a paint chip could have contaminated the filter, causing it to go into bypass. These filters are packaged in cardboard boxes. There was no damage noted to the box containing the filter.

As someone whos researched my share of aviation accident reports over the years, its frustrating to dissect those reports and pick out the various missteps made and the points at which a change in direction, a precautionary landing or other mitigation would have altered the outcome. Loyal readers of this journal understand that aviation accidents arent preordained and, instead, often result from a complex series of events occurring over time. Its often called the accident chain, a term recognizing how these events are linked. Often, individual events occurring in an accident chain, by themselves, would not result in a new accident report. The accident chain concept has great value, but Ive come to think of it as a trajectory instead of a chain.

After the usual say again your callsign back and forth, the controller determined there was no flight plan on file. A new voice from the Learjet, probably the captain, asked if he could air-file over the ATC frequency. The controller instead suggested the Lear could file its flight plan over the radio by talking to Flight Service. This is when it got interesting: The Learjet then asked for the Flight Service frequency and a clearance to 17,500 feet. It got even more interesting when ATC suggested calling Flight Service on 122.1 MHz. All of a sudden, here were three blatant examples of poor airmanship and incomplete knowledge.

Looking back, the results were predictable, but the pilots and operators of earlier aircraft rarely had a choice. Advances in technology today allow precise engine monitoring and data evaluation so as to accurately predict and prevent upcoming partial or complete engine failures. In fact, monitoring has improved to the point that its rare for a modern and properly maintained-and operated-piston aircraft engine to fail without some kind of warning. The operators job is to conduct appropriate monitoring and analysis, and then to act when the data indicate a problem. Establishing an engine monitoring program and the minimal investment in equipment and training can be a significant factor in improving safety and reducing the overall cost of operation.

Lets start by dispensing with the obvious: Loss of control in flight is a lousy explanation, and not much better as a description. Eventually well come up with something better, which hopefully will reflect the myriad ways pilots can let aircraft get away from them. Spatial disorientation in IMC is as different from a moose stall as wake turbulence is from sloppily flown S-turns on final. At best, the ICAOs accident taxonomy-adopted by the FAA and NTSB, presumably in the name of harmonization-provides snapshots of how accident sequences end with negligible insight into what triggered them or how they developed. As a safety strategy, Dont lose control is about as useful as Dont let the engine quit.