Handling emergencies and unusual situations is a significant part of learning to fly and remaining current to fly any airplane. Flight training can’t possibly teach pilots how to handle every single event they could encounter, however. With that concept in mind, pilots are often taught to look for the similarities between one event and another to help them more quickly find a solution to the situation at hand. That kind of training demands making certain assumptions about the pilots who will occupy the flight deck.
NTSB Questions Both FAA and Boeing Assumptions on 737 Max
Key Takeaways:
- Boeing designed the 737 MAX with the flawed assumption that pilots would easily identify an MCAS malfunction as a familiar runaway trim, leading them to omit specific training on MCAS and overlook the distracting effect of multiple concurrent alerts.
- The NTSB concluded that these assumptions ignored critical human factors, as simultaneous and confusing cockpit warnings in accident flights overwhelmed pilots, preventing them from immediately diagnosing and counteracting the uncommanded MCAS inputs.
- The NTSB has urged the FAA to revamp aircraft certification processes, requiring system safety assessments to account for all potential flight deck alerts and their combined impact on pilot recognition and response, and to develop better tools for evaluating human factors in design.
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