Handling emergencies and unusual situations is a significant part of learning to fly and remaining current to fly any airplane. Flight training can’t possibly teach pilots how to handle every single event they could encounter, however. With that concept in mind, pilots are often taught to look for the similarities between one event and another to help them more quickly find a solution to the situation at hand. That kind of training demands making certain assumptions about the pilots who will occupy the flight deck.
NTSB Questions Both FAA and Boeing Assumptions on 737 Max
Key Takeaways:
- Boeing's design of the 737 Max and its MCAS system was based on assumptions that pilots would easily recognize and counteract MCAS failures, similar to a runaway electric trim, and that specific training on MCAS was unnecessary due to its perceived rarity.
- The NTSB determined that Boeing overlooked critical human factors, as multiple simultaneous alerts and indications during the 737 Max accidents overwhelmed and distracted pilots, preventing them from promptly identifying and responding correctly to the MCAS malfunction.
- The NTSB believes the existing process for evaluating aircraft designs needs improvement, as current methods for assessing human error and pilot response to complex, multi-alert failure conditions in safety assessments are inadequate.
- The NTSB recommends that the FAA ensure future system safety assessments fully consider the combined impact of all flight deck alerts on pilot recognition and response, and develop better tools for pilots to prioritize failure indications.
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