On inspection of the wreckage it was immediately evident that the elevator pushrod had not been attached to the elevator. The pilot, who had flown the glider at least 50 times and had assembled it himself as many as 25 times, had taken his time assembling it about two hours before the flight. As he was awaiting tow, a friend of his (who was also a former co-owner of the glider) had helped him to check control continuity. The check they used for the elevator was for the pilot to apply up-elevator stick while the friend held the elevator. In retrospect, after the accident, the friend realized that in this test the rod could push against the elevator from below without actually being attached to it. It would only be by a down-elevator control input, which would pull the control pushrod away from the elevator, that continuity could be positively verified. The instruction manual for the sailplane specified a pulling motion to verify the proper attachment of the control rods to the ailerons and airbrakes, but did not mention this method with regard to the elevator. It stated that a "positive control check" should be performed before each flight, but did not say, in the case of the elevator, what such a check ought to consist of.