The most significant finding to emerge from the accident, apart from the stated probable cause, was that the FAA's right hand didn't know what its left hand was doing. The NTSB reported that the fin failed at a load more than one-third higher than that required for certification; thus, Airbus was blameless. Pilots, on the other hand, found it inexplicable that any aerodynamic load could cause a failure in an airplane flying under VA, the maneuvering speed. By and large, pilots believed that you can't break an airplane at or below VA. They had good reason for thinking so. The FAA's own "Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge" says that "any combination of flight control usage, including full deflection of the controls, or gust loads created by turbulence should not create an excessive air load if the airplane is operated below [the] maneuvering speed." FAR Part 25 contained a requirement that pilots be made aware that "full application of rudder and aileron controls ... should be confined to speeds below" the maneuvering speed-a declaration that does not state, but that most people would understand to imply, that such control applications below the maneuvering speed would not, incidentally, tear the airplane apart.