The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) says the deadly crash of the Piper PA-28-161 in Kentucky in 2023 was caused by an in-flight breakup after the aircraft entered an area of severe thunderstorms during a night flight.
The event caught the attention of the aviation community because the flight instructor, Timothy McKellar Jr., 22, documented the events of the flight using Snapchat, which included a series of demeaning comments aimed at Connor Quisenberry, 18, the private pilot candidate.
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The accident flight was the first time the pair had flown together.
According to the report, at the time of the accident McKellar had a total time of approximately 447 hours, of which 150 were in the previous 90 days. Quisenberry had a total of 37.
Flight Details
On September 27, 2023, the Piper Warrior belonging to Eagle Flight Academy in Owensboro, Kentucky, with McKellar and Quisenberry on board, took off on a night flight from Owensboro/Daviess County Regional Airport (KOWB) to Bowling Green-Warren County Regional Airport (KBWG) in Kentucky.
The purpose of the flight was for Quisenberry to satisfy the night flight requirements for the private pilot certificate. McKellar posted remarks indicating frustration with Quisenberry for wanting to have a conversation and the time it took him to inspect the aircraft prior to the flight. McKellar’s Snapchat story began with him talking to the camera and shaking his head along with the caption, “me and this student should not get along if he was my full-time student. I’ve seen faster at the Special Olympics.”
The camera angle is then reversed to show Quisenberry, flashlight in hand, performing what appears to be the preflight inspection of the Warrior. McKellar impatiently taps his fingers on the outside of the aircraft.
McKellar posts that the pair have a three-hour flight ahead. The video continues showing the night takeoff and in-flight cruise.
McKellar makes multiple references to Quisenberry as “Forrest Gump,” stating that he is “just giving it to him straight up,” to which Quisenberry allegedly replies to the criticism by saying, “I don’t mind you being hard on me. I know I need it.”
The Weather
According to the NSTB report, before the flight McKellar obtained a weather briefing from ForeFlight, and it “included a convective SIGMET that was active for the accident location and time. It warned of an area of severe thunderstorms with cloud tops to 42,000 feet, hail of up to 1.25 inches in diameter, and wind gusts of up to 50 knots.”
The flight to KBWG was uneventful. On the way back at 22:15, McKellar posted a screen capture to social media depicting an annotated image from a mobile-device-based aviation navigation tool. The image depicted the airplane’s current position northwest of Bowling Green, along with the planned route of flight to KOWB.
Weather radar imagery was also displayed in the image, which had been annotated with a circle around the flight track and nearby weather radar returns. McKellar comments on the cells heading toward the aircraft looking like “[expletive] off hornets.”
The NTSB noted that based on the airplane’s position at the time of the screen capture, the weather radar information depicted was about 10 minutes old.
“Given this information, it is likely that the flight instructor was aware that convective weather was in the vicinity of the planned route of flight but was not aware of the latency of the weather radar information and continued on course in an attempt to fly past the approaching convective weather,” the report said.
![Aerial image with the airplane’s flight track (white) and weather radar reflectivity information overlaid. [Courtesy: NTSB]](https://flyingmag1.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/09/Report_ERA23FA380_193156_9_4_2025-3_16_12-PM-1.jpeg?width=1024&height=504)
Latency of the weather information obtained from radar images is covered in private pilot ground school. Pilots are taught that the images they see are likely several minutes old and therefore unreliable information.
According to ADS-B data and air traffic control (ATC) voice communications, approximately 30 minutes after the screen capture was posted, McKellar contacted ATC and was warned about “heavy to extreme precipitation at the aircraft’s 9 o’clock position” and gave them a heading of 090 to fly to get out of it.
The ADS-B data shows that the airplane continued its northwesterly course, and about two minutes later, McKellar requested an IFR clearance, stating that the aircraft was “getting blown around like crazy.” The flight track shows a turn to the northwest followed by a right circling turn.
The controller repeated the 090 heading, and McKellar replied that they were in “pretty extreme turbulence.”
The flight track showed a continuing right descending turn. There was no further communication from the crew. The last ADS-B position was reported at an altitude of 2,200 feet and approximately 1,000 feet to the northwest of the wreckage. The NTSB noted the debris field covered 25 acres in densely wooded hilly terrain.
The debris field map shows the aircraft was found in pieces and sections, and both occupants had separated from the cockpit and were in different locations. The cause of death for both McKellar and Quisenberry was listed as blunt force trauma.
The factual report from the NTSB noted toxicological testing of the pilots’ specimens was conducted by the FAA Forensic Sciences Section in Oklahoma City.
The results were negative for McKellar. Quisenberry tested positive for Cetirizine (brand name Zyrtec), an over-the-counter antihistamine commonly used to treat allergies, as well as ethanol and propanol. However, the report noted that the latter was consistent with putrefaction.
The report notes that Cetirizine can have sedating effects, but the investigation could not determine if the student was impaired.
Additionally, as this was an instructional flight and Quisenberry was just a student pilot, McKellar as CFI was the PIC. Per cFAR 91.3, the pilot in command is directly responsible for and is the final authority as to the operation of that aircraft and the safety of the flight.
The Wreckage
All major components of the airplane, with the exception of the left portion of the stabilator, were located in the debris field.
The fuselage was separated aft of the rear seat, and the forward fuselage—including the cockpit, engine, and right wing—was located together in the most westerly portion of the debris field. The left wing, with aileron attached, was separated from the fuselage and located about 800 feet east of the forward fuselage. The flap was separated from the wing. The right wing remained attached to the forward fuselage and was upside down with the aileron and flap attached.
The empennage with vertical stabilizer intact was located over a ridge about 200 feet north of the forward fuselage. The rudder was torn diagonally from top to bottom, with the lower portion remaining attached to the vertical stabilizer and the upper portion separated and located near the empennage in the debris field.
The stabilator was torn chordwise just outboard of the hinges. The right side of the stabilator was located about 1,500 feet away from the forward fuselage in the most eastern edge of the debris field.
The left wing’s interior ribs exhibited signatures consistent with the aileron bellcrank having been pulled from its mount and drawn through the wing to the inboard end. The aileron bellcrank was broken, with the balance cable arm remaining attached to the balance cable. The balance cable was continuous to the right wing. The remainder of the bellcrank was not located. The right-wing aileron cables remained attached to the bellcrank, and the bellcrank remained attached to the wing.
The cables connecting the elevator and rudder exhibited broom straw damage, and flight control cable continuity was confirmed to each respective control surface.
The throttle was found in the half-open position. The altimeter showed 2,880 feet and the vertical speed indicator 500 feet per minute up. The attitude indicator had tumbled to a 90-degree right bank.
The propeller remained attached to the crankshaft, and both propeller blades appeared straight. The engine displayed impact damage, but there was no sign of a preaccident anomaly or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation.
The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident to be the flight instructor’s improper decision to continue flight into a known area of thunderstorms, which resulted in an in-flight breakup.
The full agency report can be found below.
