Forcasting future trends is difficult in any business, but predicting the direction aviation will move has been particularly inaccurate over the past many decades. Part of the problem is that aviation is fundamentally cyclical, both in the manufacture of airplanes and in their use. Changes in the economy appear to have more to do with aviation activity than any other factor, but that information is of little use since predicting the future of the global economy has also been elusive.
I think it's safe to say that every prediction of a large change in aviation activity has been wrong. Forecasters have missed in both directions, calling for growth when a bust is about to arrive or failing to see recovery from a downturn.
Probably the biggest miss by the aviation industry forecasters happened in 1945 and into 1946. The military had created thousands of new pilots and exposed many thousands more to aviation as mechanics, gunners, bombardiers and navigators. It seemed logical that those returning servicemen would want their own airplanes. After all, they were already trained, or could learn to fly on the GI Bill. What could prevent the greatest boom in aviation history?
Nobody knows for sure, but the best guess is that 50,000 general aviation airplanes were built in the second half of 1945 and in 1946. To put that number in perspective, you need to know that there are fewer than 200,000 registered general aviation airplanes in the U.S. today. And many of those airplanes on the current registry are derelicts that haven't turned a propeller in many years.
By the end of 1946 the expected boom was over. The demand failed to show up. Many airplane manufacturers disappeared and the major companies, such as North American and Republic, that had invested in general aviation dropped out to concentrate on the military market. In 1945 and '46 Cessna built more than 7,000 140s and 120s. By 1951 Cessna built only 551 airplanes in the entire year, and they were the industry leader then as now.
The really big boom in general aviation wasn't the postwar years, but one that started in the 1970s. During this boom more than 10,000 airplanes per year were manufactured, building to a crescendo in 1979 when just short of 18,000 airplanes were delivered. Nobody in the industry or government predicted the onset of the boom, and it lasted long enough that no expert foretold the looming collapse that came in 1980. By the mid-80s the industry teetered on the brink of oblivion. Cessna, Beech, Learjet, Piper and Mooney were all purchased by large corporations as conditions made it virtually impossible for them to remain independent. Dozens of models went out of production, and manufacturers such as Aero Commander, Bellanca, Grumman American and others went out of the piston airplane building business.
The FAA's crystal ball in the 1970s was no better than the manufacturers' outlook. The official FAA forecast for the years 1979 to 1990 predicted unrestrained growth with the general aviation fleet growing from 186,000 airplanes to 310,800 by 1990. That was wrong by more than 110,000 airplanes. The FAA based much of the forecast growth on the introduction of new technology in general aviation that would make airplanes less costly to operate and easier to fly in all weather conditions. That didn't happen by 1990, and is only now starting to become a reality in 2006.
For the past few years, a new version of the technology-driving-new-airplane-deliveries' rosy forecast has been in play and it is based on development of new very light jets (VLJ) that are predicted to cost little more than a piston airplane, less than a turboprop, and will be so economical to fly that thousands will be used in a new on-demand air taxi service. The VLJ cost savings are predicted to come from new found fuel efficiencies in small jet engines and economies of scale through mass production. It is the extremely low cost that is forecast to create the air taxi boom. If you believe the most ardent VLJ proponents, it will be possible to charter a VLJ for less than a piston twin, such as a Baron or Navajo, which are the staples of the light end of the air taxi market today.
I have never believed that the VLJs can deliver the promised performance for the price. The initial predictions from Eclipse, for example, fell by the wayside years ago, and the current price is half again as much as the original. No VLJ exists yet, so it's impossible to know what the actual costs of acquisition and operation will be until they enter production and start flying. But we can be sure it will cost more than forecast, because that's the way aviation, and the rest of life, for that matter, operates.
