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Air France 447 Crash: Final Report Points to Pilot Error, Confusion

By Bethany Whitfield / Published: Jul 06, 2012
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Air France 447 Black Box

Air France 447 Black Box lying on the floor of
the Atlantic.

In the final report issued Thursday on the Air France 447 crash that killed 228 people in May 2009, investigators said the pilots were “completely surprised” by technical problems experienced at high altitude and engaged in increasingly de-structured actions until suffering  “the total loss of cognitive control of the situation.”

The report, issued by the BEA – France’s aviation accident investigative authority – paints a picture of profound confusion and poor task sharing between the two copilots as events leading to the crash rapidly unfolded.

The Airbus A330, en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, was flying over the mid-Atlantic at 35,000 feet when the pitot tubes iced over, triggering the aircraft’s autopilot and autothrust to disengage and causing a loss of accurate airspeed information.

As the captain rested outside of the cockpit, one of the two remaining copilots took manual control of the aircraft and made nose-up inputs that caused the aircraft to exit the flight envelope less than one minute later and enter a stall that caused it to lose altitude at a rate greater than 10,000 fpm.

Despite multiple stall warnings, including one that lasted continuously for 54 seconds, neither of the copilots acknowledged them nor the appearance of stall buffet.

The fly-by-wire A330 incorporates envelope protection technology that prevents the airplane from entering a stall in most cases. During a complete loss of airspeed information, however, that system reverts to manual control, and the airplane behaves much like a conventional airliner.

The report maintains that the pilots’ actions indicate they perhaps believed they were in an overspeed situation as opposed to a stall. According to investigators, the training likely undergone by the A330 pilots associated buffet with a potential overspeed situation, despite the fact that on the aircraft buffet is actually only experienced when approaching a stall.  

Adding to the confusion was the fact that the stall warning, by design, turned on and off as the aircraft fluctuated amid very low airspeed levels.

In the wake of the crash, authorities put forth a number of changes and recommendations, included among them the requirement for additional airspeed training, better relief crew instructions and a shorter time period between pitot tube maintenance checks. Air France has also replaced pitot tubes in its fleet made by Thales with a different version from Goodrich.

The BEA also recommended that authorities enact training dedicated to high altitude stall approach and recovery and suggested that authorities review the possibility of adding an angle of attack indicator in the cockpit.

View photos of the wreckage of Air France 447.

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farmerdoc's picture

The "possibility of adding an angle of attack indicator in the cockpit"? Are you kidding me? An airplane of this cost and it doesn't have one? Why doesn't EVERY airplane have one? Suggestion: put it right above the fancy glass panel!

robbieremlap's picture

First, I have a bias. I used to work for Boeing, but not in design or flight standards; I was a lowly computer programmer/analyst.
I fail to understand the European design philosophy in this case. When two or three pitots do not agree, why not extrapolate an air speed factor from the GPS? In other words, store the latest ground speed and also the latest difference in ground speed and air speed, both of which are (or were recently) available, and, upon pitot failure, use the last figures to generate an artificial air speed figure to allow the plane to continue on course, and not close down as if they were landed. At the same time there should be a buzzer warning to the pilots that they're not on pitots any more, but a generated air speed. This is how I would design the system.

Martin E Haisman's picture

It is solely Air France at fault with pilots unions and associations advising about the faulty Thales pitot tubes many months before the crash and Airbus advising AF of the issue over a year before hand. Air France is at fault for lack of pilot training and operating an aircraft in a known dangerous condition. There is an organisational culture within the French aviation community and the BEA protecting vested business interests and national pride over safety. Many other variables contributed to the accident but the chain of events started with complacency in pilot training and complacency in maintaining the aircraft. It is also questionable with all the technology the French have they could not locate the wreckage or black boxes and after immense pressure from the Families of the victims Woods hole institute (Basically oceanographcy organisation) finds it within two weeks without black box pingers. Irrespective of supercooling identified as a probable cause of the pitots freezing the question is would the replacements have overcome this. A personal opinion non feedback sidesticks (Joysticks) and the non moving throttle levers of the Airbus do not help an emergency situation.

David Connolly's picture

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose, Voilla ! on a rainy convective July 5 2012,LFPG 051600Z 04004KT 5000 RA BKN040 BKN053 18/16 Q1009 NOSIG. And as predictable, with so many vested interests, the BEA’s final report on AF447 says nothing on the elephants, hippos and rhinos in the room. That is, the anti-human A-318-80 drone pilot philosophy, though in fairness to the BEA, they left no other Boulevard unexplored.
To wit :
1) First and foremost ,Autotrim in manual flight:
To kill yourself should require a bit of biceps/triceps beef in general.
2) The human solution would be an ergonomic thumb trigger, activation of which puts the controls from Normal to Alternate Law. And thereafter, that activation, keeps the human pilot connected to the ship. Being connected is also illustrated in the pilot’s seats. F/O Bonin’s seat had no belts remaining, F/O Robert in Captain Dubois’s seat only had the lap belt remaining. This shows that F/O Bonin was completely belted/connected with a 5 point harness from takeoff and F/O Robert less so with 3 points casual CRZ relief belting. Not a fault per se, I’ve done that too, but illustrative, none the less.
When the tail slammed first into the South Atlantic Ocean, compressing all of the aft-CG occupants to instant death, they, the pilots, no longer crew, were ripped-extended upwards and shredded out of their seats to instant death, beyond our living comprehension. Captain Dubois was non-belted and partially seated and slammed upward upon impact to instant death through the crumpled-folded fuselage crown. He was one of the first clothed victims recovered from the ocean surface. Bombed AI182 of June 23 1985, killing 329 mass-murder victims, yielded naked victims from high altitude explosive destruction of flail injuries, unlike AF447, and like PA103 of Dec 21 1988, killing 270 mass-murder victims.
The only eye catcher of the only Airbus cockpit auto-moving control are the stab trim wheel’s white stripes, not so compellingly visible on the visual field periphery on a moonless convective CB night of the ICTZ. So typically and incoherently European is Airbus, in its assumed FBW arrogance, like its Emissions Taxing Scam, rightly rejected by China’s CAAC on Feb 6 2012, without negotiation, that FBW mode confusion leaves one confused as to where to start negotioations and upon what basis and to what conclusion ?. If one was indecisive, Airbus FBW leaves one not so sure.
My B-744 sim and plane rule is this. First, be seated, slotted(flight plan on clipboard in slot by my right FO ankle), QRH in the slot at 90 degrees to it. Then, be belted to 5 points, lighted , as in panel/dome, storm to override all lights as I wish, as PF and rested to be nested. That means my seat arm rests down, so that for manual flight I have an arm fulcrum and a hand/eye reference for belted and braced PFD accuracy, in effect, I strap on the ship to my back to be relaxed and I have the roasted seared sim scars to prove it. But my greatest learning experience is of previous assumptions. Still, if you never love, you never care, if you never care, you never learn and repeat previous assumptions to rote learned disaster. As I always remember of Dublin’s Parisian Samuel Beckett’s 1983 parody of Westward Ho, his Worstward Ho. “All of old. Nothing else ever. Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better”. Beckett died in Paris on December 22 1989. It is a pity that Air France nor the SNPL read his works.
3) Asynchronous flight controls:
Except the rudder pedals. This inconsistent Euro-fudge is like the ECB being issuer of a central Euro currency, with no central treasury backstop. What could go wrong in Eurotopia ?
4) Having auto disconnect of A/P and A/T. On the B-744 and other Boeings, it is “recommended” to disconnect for unreliable airspeed, but it will not immediately abdicate, it is up to the pilot to adjudicate.
5) The stall warning system, while not compelling, has a well demonstrated fatal flaw, best illustrated in the AF-447 Entrée of XL Airways Germany’s A-320 Flight GXL888T FERRY TRNG FLIGHT on US Thanksgiving, Nov 27 2008, but in fact, an acceptance and check flight for its return to Air New Zealand after its lease. It was painted in ANZ livery before and the pressurized water cleaning caused water ingress into the core AOA vane sensor’s drive gear. 2 out of 3 AOA sensors then froze at TOC@ FL320 and after low speed tests at the rather low altitude of 5000 feet and stall-aided by full auto-trim-and crash into the Mediterranean Sea off Perpignan. Of Course the French SNPL http://aviationsafetynetwork.wordpress.com/tag/snpl/ are like an accordion player in battle, a lot of noisy useless baggage. They think the stall warning is central, rather than peripheral to the demise of AF447, when AF447’s crew were in fact acting as individual de-facto test pilots, flying their side of the aircraft, in panic, unlike test pilots acting in calm crew coordinated formation. If your building is on fire, do you stop using available fire extinguisher, with visible flames even though the fire alarm has burned out ?, if you are in the pub and knowingly left your keys there, do you go into the street looking under a lamppost looking for what is impossible to find, in effect, using the lamppost for support rather than illumination ?The SNPL seems to think so for either scenario and no thanks given for that AF447 Entrée of 2008.
6) Quoting from the BEA report of that crash that claimed 7 lives “When the real AOA increased, the blockage of AOA sensors 1&2 at similar values caused the rejection of ADR 3 anemometric values, EVEN THOUGH THESE WERE VALID. This rejection was performed by VOTE WITHOUT ANY CHECK THAT THE PARAMETERS WERE CONSISTANT WITH EACH OTHER. The crew was not aware of this rejection, except indirectly through the loss of CAT 3 DUAL approach capacity.”
7) A latent design failure if ever there was one and an inconvenient truth, not addressed at all on the BEA’s AF447 report, nor the SNPL or Air France or Airbus. The latter three have serious vested interests of culpability avoidance bordering evasion. Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose, Voilla encore !
8) The RTO of a Virgin B-744 from London Heathrow on Dec 7 2006, illustrates http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Boeing%20747-4Q8,%20G-VHO... Boeings have 2 AOA vanes and they do not vote, either alarm is valid. I vote early and often. AOA voting is a high cost luxury.
9) Second opinion ?, a triple IRS weighted position is optimal in LNAV. In VNAV AOA, it is not. Think of a second medical opinion for an acute diagnosis. One would not seek a third lest it agree with the first, generally ?.
10) Stalls must be acted out, NOT, voted out, that type of voting is a very high cost AOA luxury, a great illustration of the wrong time and place. Democracy is generally suspended in a war zone, as a stall, Wind Sheer /TCAS RA is. In the XL disaster, Normal Law was democratically voted out. Think-ironically-Germany 1933 for another similar democratic deficit perspective, voted in to vote out.
11) The BEA’s AF447 AOA display recommendation is largely irrelevant, as if you are at such an AOA to be wondering about it, there is most likely an IAS deficit, evolving at a V/S to an altitude deficit pancake crash.
12) Boeings are designed by geniuses for idiots, Airbus is the opposite-QED.
13) Side Sticks or Mini-Manche in French are the opposite of Bull Wheel Boeing yokes, in that they have a bias for over-control in inverse proportion to their size. A man sized Boeing yoke has a natural ergonomic-human bias for under-control. This glaring fact is of course conspicuous by its absence in the BEA’s final report on AF447.
14) The July 5 2012 BEA report may be final on AF447, but it will never be the last word on the crash of the century.
15) Assumption makes an ass of u and me and is the mother of most disasters-QED AF447.

2 h 10 min 23 The THR LK mode is de-activated,
the thrust levers remain on the CLB
detent. The N1 starts to increase and reach
around 104 % in 12 seconds.
Their black colour contributing to its out of scan anonymity. A Boeing A/T’s conspicuous white thrust lever position is in phase with its thrust level delivered. So, for a theoretical similar alternate Boeing A/T mode, there would not be such a jump in thrust level, as there was on AF 447, with a demonstrated jump in N1 from previous CRZ to actual CLB detent.
ECAM’s “ENG THRUST LOCKED
-THR LEVERS………MOVE”
and
“AUTO FLT A/THR OFF
-THR LEVERS………MOVE”
are not compelling messages in a cascading failure sweat to move static thrust levers aft to actual thrust PDQ. Further, in a de-structured human panic mode non-compelling “Stall Stall” with a cavalry charge audio assist, is actually not heard. A stick shaker is one the most compelling tactile-audio warning on a flightdeck.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YaB2io0UyOk&feature=endscreen&NR=1
2 h 11 min 58
La vitesse verticale est d’environ -15 300 ft/min.
(F/O PF Bonin)J’ai un problème c’est
que j’ai plus de vario là
I have a problem it’s
that I don’t have vertical
speed indication - THIS V/S is off the IRS scale and on the FDR scale, as it is academic, as much as on a Boeing or Airbus
(Captain Dubois)D’accord
Okay
(F/O PF Bonin)J’ai plus aucune Indication
I have no more displays
2 h 11 min 58 The vertical speed is around -
15,300 ft/min. THIS V/S is off the IRS scale and on the FDR scale, as it is academic, so the PFD’s V/S pointer was pegged at the bottom of the tape.
2 h 12 min 04
2 h 12 min 07
The airbrakes are controlled and
deployed. (F/O PF Bonin) J’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou non qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ?
I have the impression that we have some crazy speed no what do you think?
2 h 12 min 07 FL 29736
The angle of attack 2 is temporarily
valid at 41°.
The stall warning is triggered.
(F/O PM/PNF Robert) Non surtout ne ne (les) sors pas
No above all don’t extend (the)
SV : “Stall, stall”
02:12:14 (F/O PM/PNF Robert) Qu'est-ce que tu en penses? Qu'est-ce que tu en penses? Qu'est-ce qu'il faut faire?
What do you think? What do you think? What should we do?
02:12:15 (Captain Dubois) Alors, là, je ne sais pas!
Well, I don't know!
2 h 12 min 59 (F/O PF Bonin)Je suis à fond à… avec du gauchissement
I’m at the limit… with the roll
(Captain Dubois) Le palonnier
The rudder bar
2 h 13 min 38
(Captain Dubois) Doucement avec le palonnier là
Careful with the rudder bar there ……This is the only reference Captain Dubois made to a control input, because he could obviously SEE some desperate rudder dancing and was probably cognisant of the demise of AA587, an A-300-600 on Nov 12 2001 in New York. His error was not immediately physically taking over when both operating crew stated they were out of control. “Crew Fail, Pilot Fly”, would be a good muscle memory call in future. F/O Bonin’s stick inputs, had he held a Boeing yoke would have been immediately evident, even in a blind panic, to F/O Robert, long before Captain Dubois rushed back to the bridge. Of course none are so blind, as those that will not see or cannot comprehend what is being seen and heard in a saturated brain.

02:13:40 ( F/O PM/PNF Robert) Remonte... remonte... remonte... remonte...
Climb... climb... climb... climb...

02:13:40 (F/O PF Bonin) Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l'heure!
But I've had the stick back the whole time!

At last, Bonin tells the others the crucial fact whose import he has so grievously failed to understand himself.

02:13:42 (Captain Dubois) Non, non, non... Ne remonte pas... non, non.
No, no, no... Don't climb... no, no.
I suspect that this utterance was a sudden desperate realization of the unbelievable fact of them being stalled and finished and yet still possibly disbelieving it as a bunkrest nightmare.

02:13:43 (F/O PM/PNF Robert) Alors descends... Alors, donne-moi les commandes... À moi les commandes!
Descend, then... Give me the controls... Give me the controls!

Bonin yields the controls, and Robert finally puts the nose down. The plane begins to regain speed. But it is still descending at a precipitous angle. As they near 2000 feet, the aircraft's EGPWS detects the fast-approaching surface and trigger a new alarm. There is no time left to build up speed by pushing the plane's nose forward into a dive. At any rate, without warning his colleagues, Bonin once again takes back the controls and pulls his side stick all the way back, in an emotional reflex rather than rational attempt at survival. This would happen on any aircraft in that unique situation.

02:14:23 ( F/O PM/PNF Robert) Putain, on va taper... C'est pas vrai!
Damn it, we're going to crash... This can't be happening!

02:14:25 (F/O PF Bonin) Mais qu'est-ce que se passe?
But what's happening?

02:14:27 (Captain Dubois) 10-Dix degrès d'assiette...
Ten degrees pitch...

Exactly 1.4 seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder stops.
Stopped upon the dreadful glowing Parisian dawn of June 1 2009, yet never forgotten in UTC perpetuity.
And last and not least, let's have a bit more confidence manual flight where possible. Initially one is a bit pitchy, rolly, thrusty untill the rust is roasted out and one evolves from lame to laminer.
Manual flight builds confidence and confidence builds capital on a capital intensive industry where return on invested capital is low or negative. Human capital is priceless and when training-as it mostly is-is seen as a cost and not an investment, its lack of cost will truly be dreadfully priceless from Colgan to AF447, again.

FDG300's picture

I also flew back that night and I was shocked to learn that they flew through a tunderstorm area where embedded CB's were forcasted up to FL 570???

Read the updated report from Tim Vasquez carefully, what the hell were they doing there???

And the AF pilots were warned by Airbus not to fly in known icing conditions with that type of pitot tubes.

So many lives waisted by; so sorry pure incompetence!

I am mad so mad.

The Airbus 340 that was waisted in Canada? Everybody was diverting but no they pressed on!

F/Off waited 11 seconds before applying reverse!?

Some airlines need to work on their attitude on how to apply flightsafety.

CIA can be deadly, this time CIA stands for; Chauvinism, Incompetence and Arrogance.

I have 15.000 hours and counting but I still have a "license to learn"

Fly safe out there

Frank

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