There Are Lessons
By Richard L. Collins
August 2008
 I recently had a long conversation with a pilot who is a Cirrus owner as well as a student of the airplane's history. We found things to agree on, and things to disagree on, but the dialogue was and is important. He thinks that I am picking on the Cirrus because I refer to it so much. That is not the case. I like to study it because it is a new design airplane with exciting features like an airframe parachute, and it is backed up with what is probably the industry's most extensive training program for a fixed-gear single-engine airplane. There are more important safety lessons to be learned from the accident history of the Cirrus than from any other source when it comes to new airplanes.
Start with an important item, which I have discussed before. Cirrus pilots do fly more IFR flights and hours than Cessna 182 pilots, for example. You can look at flightaware.com any day and see that there are often twice as many Cirrus airplanes in the system as there are Cessna 182s.
My Cirrus guy says this proves that Cirrus airplanes fly more because everyone who goes places in an airplane goes on an IFR flight plan. I don't agree.
Cirrus pilots are taught, in their training program, to operate IFR and they file and fly IFR. This has nothing to do with instrument flying, it deals only with the type of flight plan the pilot files and flies. Clear skies are often filled with Cirruses and other airplanes on IFR flight plans.
By contrast, the new Cessna 182 that I rent and fly is not often flown on IFR flight plans other than when I fly it or on training flights. The airplane has flown over 400 hours and there are few flight plans stored in the G1000. Pilots who fly 182s are far more likely to fly VFR except when the weather dictates that they file and fly IFR. Most pilots who fly 182s are not the type who file and fly IFR on clear days. Nor, apparently, do they push as hard to get places in their airplanes.
This pilot opined that when the Cessna 350/400 is delivered in numbers it will have a similar accident history to the Cirrus. I don't quite agree because I think the 350/400 might not do as well as the Cirrus.
For one thing, the 350/400 might not have as thorough a training program as the Cirrus has. Even more important, though, is the pilot personality factor. The 350/400 comes across as a more aggressive airplane than the Cirrus and more aggressive airplanes have always attracted more aggressive pilots. Certainly the accidents that the 350/400 had as Lancair and Columbia airplanes reflected this. Like the Cirrus accidents they have been related more to what the pilot does with the airplane, or tries to do with the airplane, than to the airplane itself. By contrast, the Cessna 182 hardly attracts aggressive pilots and its accident history reflects this.
The 182 will likely forever have a better record than the Cirrus or the Cessna 350/400, not because it is a "better" airplane or because of superior flying qualities but because of its personality.
Even the training business is suspect. Training can ensure that the pilot is familiar with the flying qualities of an airplane as well as its systems, including avionics. What training can't do is keep the pilot from taking risks that are totally out of proportion to the rewards. I think the Cirrus experience should cause us to seriously question the purpose and the effectiveness of training in what are basically simple single-engine airplanes.
In the Cirrus fatal accidents where probable cause has been established and pilot experience is listed, there are neither a lot of low-time pilots nor a lot of low-time Cirrus pilots. Of 23 accidents studied, the most inexperienced pilot had 185 hours with 12 in type. Only about a third of the pilots had less than 100 hours in a Cirrus and two had 500 or more hours in type.
The conclusion that I draw is that Cirrus pilots leave their initial training well prepared to operate the airplane and they do so for a while. As far as the stick, rudder, throttle and the avionics knobs go, they are competent pilots. They fly until they reach that temptation point and cross a line in an attempt to do something with the airplane that is beyond their ability or the airplane's capability. The accident has nothing to do with the airplane, the pilot's training or the pilot's experience. It has everything to do with the pilot's inability to distinguish between the possible and the impossible.
Most pilots who fly Cirrus airplanes and who will be flying Cessna 350/400s are family men with successful business or professional lives. In many cases there are probably misgivings about their flying among family and friends. That means that the pilot usually puts some effort into trying to convince the doubters that flying is "safe." That is all well and good, but trouble comes if and when the pilot convinces himself that flying is anywhere near being "safe." The pilot is the determinant of that and, as we have learned many times over the years, the slightest lapse in judgment can kill you quick.
The Price of Fuel
Avgas prices are high enough to make a grown man cry. Historically, avgas has been as much as twice the price of automobile gasoline and in some places avgas is at or near that level.
So is there a pony in this room full of manure? It is hard to find but things might not be as far out of whack as you think, at least relative to things that happened in the past.
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