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Air France 447 Said To Have Suffered Deep Stall

By Stephen Pope / Published: May 25, 2011
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Flying Magazine | The World’s Most Widely Read Aviation Magazine

One of the black boxes of Air France 447
being retrieved from the bottom of the Atlantic.

Photo: BEA

German newspaper Der Spiegel is reporting that stricken Air France Flight 447 appears to have entered a deep stall from which the Airbus A330’s crew could not recover before crashing into the Atlantic Ocean on June 1, 2009. The newspaper cites sources close to the investigation as saying cockpit voice recorder data shows 58-year-old captain Marc Dubois rushed into the cockpit from the crew rest area after trouble started and began issuing instructions to two copilots as they desperately sought to deal with the in-flight emergency.

Air France Flight 447’s flight recordings show the aircraft slowed to a stall after its speed sensors failed while the two copilots were at the controls, sources told the newspaper.

The crash killed all 228 aboard, triggering a massive search for the airplane wreckage and its black boxes, which were finally located two and half miles below the ocean surface earlier this month. French accident investigation authorities are expected to issue a factual report tomorrow as manufacturer Airbus presses for a quick resolution to the matter, apparently confident that no technical problems with the A330 caused the crash. Indeed, immediately after information from the airplane’s flight data recorder was analyzed, Airbus issued a bulletin to A330 operators telling them investigators had not been able to pinpoint any technical failure.

Details leaked to Der Spiegel paint a picture of a crew attempting to navigate around severe storms while en route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris before the airplane went out of control. The big question now rests on whether pilot error or a technical malfunction is to blame. Airbus reportedly would like to have that answer made public before the start of next month’s Paris Air Show.

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Codehead's picture

How do you get into an unrecoverable stall, when you have 30,000 feet to recover in? Evidence shows that the Airbus did a "belly flop" onto the ocean.

gollum's picture

I observe that there are occasions when 'pilot error' appears to encompass an atrophy of basic seat of the pant flying skills, understandable perhaps when one's flying the numbers all the time, somewhat removed from the immediate sensations associated with flying light(er) aircraft. I may be quite mistaken and one wonders whether training and re-certification of the 'big' boys and girls involves identification of basic flying situations without instruments?

swbeyer's picture

I suspect that the pilots did not fully understand the "big picture", but were instead focusing on the various alarms and warnings that were going off. A stall is easy to recover from if one has sufficient altitude. Nose down and add power. Very simple. We'll know more on Friday when the initial report is released.

RockyBob's picture

I'd known about deep stall going all the way back to the BAC 1-11 test flights, but didn't understand how it applied to non-T-tail aircraft. True deep stall involves getting the horizontal stabilizer in or below the disturbed air from the wing. The BAC 1-11 crew simply could not get the elevators to exert enough force to force the nose down.
This website http://www.rbogash.com/Safety/deep_stall.html
has a great description of a pseudo-deep stall of a 727 caused not because the tail couldn't bring the nose down, but because the crew misunderstood what was going on. Like 447 they lost airspeed indications. Then, for some reason, they believed they were in danger of excess Mach, and they interpreted stall for high speed buffet. AOA was way too high, rate of descent was way too high, and yet they pulled back on the stick all the way to the ground. Ugh!
How else could a standard tail jetliner not drop it's nose for 30,000 feet?

Bapele's picture

It is of course much easier to blame the pilot and co-pilots who cannot defend themselves than to consider technical malfunction on Airbus and its suppliers and Air France. As for the factual report to be issued tomorrow by BEA, we can only expect "selected" information but no transcripts or recordings that will bring any new information as for the causes of this terrible accident. Just one month prior to the Paris Air Show what can we expect?

RockyBob's picture

I'm not a pilot (just a retired aero engineer) so I have a question for pilots: Since flight simulators tilt the cockpit back to simulate acceleration, is it reasonable that an big AOA (25 degrees?) could be interpreted by a panicked pilot into thinking he was accelerating? At night, with no visual clues, with maybe too much going on to read all the instruments? And maybe thinking the plane was slightly nose down and picking up a lot of speed? Just thinking. And if so, might that pilot get obsessed about not going trans-sonic?

Codehead's picture

This points out the fragility of flying at the very extremes of the aircraft's capabilities. The envelope that these jets fly in is only +-10 KIA, where 10 knots too slow means the jet stalls and 10 knots too fast means it breaks the sound barrier. Stop and think about that for a minute: 10 knots in an aircraft weighing thousands of pounds is not much of a leeway.

Codehead's picture

@RockyBob I'm not an expert, but that sounds plausible to me.

gsontheimer's picture

I am only flying a DA40 with a G1000 avionics suite, I have no experience with big iron aircraft. But what I do not understand: If the pitot tube(s) get iced, I still have te GPS indictate groud speed. So the malfunction of a pitot tube should be easily recognisable and the GPS provides backup GS and VS indications.

mooneymite's picture

Pilots fly exactly as they are trained. For Airbus to try to blame the pilots is disingenuous. Airbus dictates the specifications of the simulators, the training syllabus, and writes the procedures.'

When an Airbus aircraft does not behave as Airbus predicts, the pilots are "on their own". They revert to basic airmanship honed over years and years. These were no neophytes...they had thousands of hours and had obviously gone beyond basic stall training. They did the best they could faced with a situation that Airbus never envisioned.

Airbus has always tried to design pilots out of its cockpits...the Toulouse accident was vintage Airbus logic. Once again, this philosophy has bitten them in the arse. Now they've got some s'plainin to do and they are yelling, "PILOT ERROR".

Yeah, right.

Land Pilot's picture

First, stalling a jet is nothing like stalling your local 172. A large transport aircraft is an aircraft no one should ever stall. This is why they are equipped with stick shakers and pusher, as required by their type certificates, to ensure they are never stalled. An Airbus 330 is also a fly by wire aircraft. A feature of this aircraft is computer controlled control surfaces. The computer code governing the control surfaces is designed to never allow the aircraft to enter a stall or even an unusual attitude. Thus, for the aircraft to stall it necessitates that there must be a technical failure. The pilots failed as well if they allowed the aircraft to stall. However, if the technical failure fooled the aircraft to the extent that it would not accept the pilot inputs, there would be nothing they could do. That scenario is theoretically impossible though. If the computer receives data that is contradictory to flight regime limits, i.e., the aircraft accelerates at a high pitch angle with the power at idle, hence not possible, the computers go to a primitive mode in which the pilot inputs control the surfaces directly. At that point the computers will no longer interfere. Should an aircraft of this type already be in a deep stall by the time the computers give up control or by the time the pilots recognize what is happening, it may well be too late.

alanmurg's picture

Quote ... "A stall is easy to recover from if one has sufficient altitude. Nose down and add power. Very simple."

Yes, if you have control of the control surfaces and engine power, but what if 'The Computer" is in charge and won't let you ?

I know nothing about the Airbus computer logic, or if one can override it at any time, so can't definitively comment of course, but pilots can only react to the situation that they see at the time, as a result of information presented to them from a variety of sources, some mechanical, some human - i.e. ATC advice - and today some electronic.

For instance no pilot deliberately flies into a mountain, he flies into a mountain because he is convinced from the various bits of information erroneously presented to him that the mountain isn't there - so who is to blame, the providers of the information, which can be sub-contracted engineering things, or false information in the Operating Manual etc. etc, or the pilot for believing that the information is valid, which generally he has been taught to accept ?

Sadly the pilot often makes the last error in the chain as a result of previous errors made by others, but he isn't there to defend himself so has to shoulder the lot.

I don't believe that these pilots were negligent, they may have made errors of judgement through being misled by the information presented to them - but whose fault was that ?

I seriously doubt that we will ever be told the truth.

RHalstead's picture

A deep stall behaves quite differently than a typical stall we all experience in primary and recurrent training.

A deep stall is normally an unrecoverable stall or may require some rather unorthodox maneuvering for recovery. It happens as has already been explained, when the horizontal stab enters the turbulence from the wing and the elevator can no longer exert enough force to bring the nose down. Typically the wing and tail are both stalled, and the wash or turbulence from the stalled wing prevents the tail from doing much of anything.

The tail normally exerts a negative force which keeps the nose up. IE It pushes down behind the CG. If the horizontal stabilizer (stab) stalls the nose drops. There is a balancing act between lift from the wing and lift from the tail. In a deep stall the nose is *usually* quite high and the horizontal stab exerts no lift, either up or down. In instrument conditions, or at night with no outside reference and with instruments lying to you, your senses (and the computer) are likely to interpret this as an acceleration.

Indications are that the plane impacted, or pancaked into the water. The only typical way this can happen is in a deep stall or high angle of attack. However if the plane has flying speed (under control) it will still have a substantial forward speed even with a high angle of attack.

This phenomena (nose high = acceleration) is how simulators can *simulate* acceleration by raising the nose. Conversely acceleration with no outside reference is interpreted as a pitch change. Like Vertigo, no pilot is immune to this. Add to that your instruments are lying to you and it's all over except for the shouting.

Another point to remember is that the larger the aircraft the more momentum it has. Even many light twins may take many thousands of feet to recover when all is going right.

Codehead's picture

@RHalstead Excellent post! But was there absolutely nothing that the pilots could do to recover? If so, isn't that a defect in the aircraft design?

Codehead's picture

5/27/11

"Richard Quest, CNN's aviation expert, said: "For whatever reason the aircraft speed sensors failed and the A330 went into a high altitude stall. The pilot's actions were unable to recover the aircraft and some might say, made the bad situation worse."

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/05/27/air.france.447.crash/

Codehead's picture

(From Wikipedia:)

Some aircraft, such as the Lockheed U-2, routinely operate in the "coffin corner", which demands great skill from their pilots. The FAA is concerned that as jet aircraft become more common, less experienced pilots will be flying those aircraft closer to the altitude of their coffin corners, and that catastrophic accidents will occur as a result.[2]

swbeyer's picture

The initial report was released this morning and although no conclusions have been drawn, it's fairly clear that the pilot error was a fundamental cause, due to improper reaction to the stall warning horn. The pilot pulled the nose up repeatedly and according to the report, maintained the nose up attitude (due to control inputs) for the entire 4 minute duration of the rapid descent.

This sounds like the same pilot error that was made by the Continental Connection pilot landing in Buffalo .... he over powered the stick shaker to pull the nose up when the stall warning sounded, causing an aggravated stall at just 1000 feet.

It's hard to believe that 3 experienced pilots could make such a basic mistake and not correct it over a 4 minute period, yet that's what the report implies.

Chuck Clark's picture

No reliable airspeed indication. What where the cabin altimetry and attitude indications? Much left to learn as to how and why three highly trained pilots failed to save it. Sure hope it wasn't because HAL over-rode their valient attempts.

As for Buffalo, I suspect that the Captain was convinced he was experiencing a tail stall. Why else would he have pulled the nose up? How about a separate tail-plane stall indicator?

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