Note: I wrote this piece shortly after the crash of a Turbo Commander last Wednesday in which six persished. Many details were still unknown--the exact model of aircraft that crashed was still in dispute--and I made clear that his was not a speculative piece trying to glean a probable cause but rather a personal reflection. As a pilot certain accidents affect me--and all of those of us who fly--differently than they do non-pilots. My initial reaction was that on a flight like that, over mountainous terrain on a dark night, I would have insisted on some kind of terrain awareness. My feelings on this subject, a week later, have not changed. RG
The crash of an Aero Commander in Arizona late last week was one of those tragedies that hit me in the pit of my stomach. A dad, an experienced pilot who was flying with a couple of coworkers, had just picked up his three kids to take them to his home for Thanksgiving. Then the unthinkable happened. In the dark of night the airplane hit a ridge in high, rugged terrain and all was lost. The beauty of what we do, using airplanes to bring us closer together, turned instantly into a heart-rending tale of loss.
There has been some speculation in the aviation press about the crash, most of it responsible, but I want to say right off the bat that I don't know what happened that night. I do know the model of airplane that crashed. I do know the terrain--I learned to fly in the mountainous desert of the American Southwest. Night flight there in a single-engine airplane is a gamble, no doubt. But in the big Aero Commander twin? It's a great platform for doing just what the pilot was doing with it.
The first thought that springs to mind, and I'm sure it wasn't just me, was controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). There's been some discussion of the role that the design of the nearby Phoenix Class Bravo airspace might have played in the accident, the implication being (I'm pretty sure) that the crash might have been a result of the pilot trying to stay out of the Class B and impacting terrain as a result.
Even were that the case, the other implication is that the pilot would have been depending on a chart for terrain clearance at a relatively low altitude in very high terrain. I hope this proves not to be the case, but it sounds plausible.
There have been other CFIT accidents in recent years in the Southwest in which other airplanes flew into terrain at cruise under control. When learning of them, my heart sank just as it did last week.
The answer is, of course, a terrain awareness utility.
I been flying with some form of TAWS for a decade now. It's not expensive. Every handheld has it. You can get it on the iPad (along with a lot of other good stuff) for a hundred bucks a year.
In this day and age, flying at night or in weather over any kind of terrain, there's simply no excuse not to have some kind of TAWS and to use it.
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Submitted by flyingiceman on November 29, 2011.
Fact is that this aircraft, unless it had seat belts removed, was required to have TAWS. No doubt the NTSB will check this out but how they will ever determine if it was working at the time of the accident is beyond me. I actually logged a couple of hours in the accident aircraft many moons ago and over 3000 hours in type. I also know the area quite well.
Couple of quick thoughts - of course TWAS would not have been any benefit in their preflight planning process. If you look closely at the airspace you'll find that the flight they were attempting was simply not viable. They could not stay under the Class Bravo AND above the MSA. Further, once they reached the edge of the Class Bravo they would need to be at 7,000 ft to comply with the wildlife area restrictions. They would have had to climb from below 5,000 ft to 7000 ft in one mile. I am going to speculate that there is zero chance that they understood this challenge and said “let’s do it”. Why they missed it will be the subject of much conjecture and investigation. One possibility is that they erroneously assumed that the FAA would not create a situation where you had an MSA and a Class Bravo floor that were essentially in conflict with one another and wouldn't allow for a safe climb gradient over adjacent terrain. The AOPA cautioned the FAA about this specific airspace (mentioning the Superstition Range by name) in 2006. The FAA went ahead with their airspace redesign anyway. Why? I suspect that will be a question exhaustively explored by lawyers in the coming weeks, months and years. Frankly, if I was on the airspace design team I would be absolutely sick to my stomach right now. (Perhaps I am missing something here and being unfair. If so tell me what it is.) When you do the math you see they had 30 seconds or less to climb above the terrain once they cleared the edge of the Bravo. Think about that....30 seconds if they start their climb EXACTLY at the edge of the Bravo at night with a full airplane. Possible in an AC90? Yep. Recommended?, not even on a bright sunny day. Even if you did clear the terrain you’d be in violation of the wildlife area altitude restrictions.
If they had TWAS and it was working it should have progressively warned them. I have had TWAS alerts in the flight levels in my Commanders. Conclusion, they don't always work as designed. No surprise. More importantly, I have had them warn when they shouldn't at lower altitudes. My first reaction, wrongly no doubt, has been to pause before reacting. I am not expecting it and I want to understand the threat before I react especially with the Class Bravo and the associated traffic above me. Given the small margin they had, any delay in action was likely fatal. Certainly synthetic vision (even the reasonable facsimile that's available on a handheld) would have helped. Using the flight profile view on ADDS or on a handheld like the 796 from Garmin would have led to the right questions in the preflight planning process.
It will not be surprising if the NTSB concludes that the PIC did not make himself fully aware of all the data necessary to safely complete the flight as planned. To what degree the FAA will be held accountable given the concerns expressed to them by the AOPA will be make this investigation worth watching.
The thing that scares me about this accident is it could have happened to anyone. How many times have you said, “busy airspace tonight…let’s go VFR, we’ll stay 500 ft below the Class Bravo and climb to cruise altitude at the edge”? If you had been at KFFZ headed to KSAD in a fast aircraft on the busiest air travel day of the year, with three young kids who, no doubt, were a little restless, with NO chance of a class bravo and a likely delay for an IFR, would you have had the discipline to recognize that the flight wasn’t possible. Would you have even been able to put your hands on a VFR sectional if you were flying a turbine? Would you have had the patience to wait to get an IFR clearance? When that TWAS alert fired when you were totally focused on not busting the airspace above would you have instantly climbed even though airliners were descending right from above? All I will say is knowing what I know today? the answer is a resounding yes!. This tragedy has changed me forever.
Submitted by robert goyer on November 29, 2011.
Great comment.
I should have clearly pointed out that the Commander in question was required to have TAWS. Whether it was being monitored is not known and might never be. My point was that even pilots flying airplanes not required to have TAWS should get it and use it. That's the point I intended to make.
Your points are very well taken. Distraction, possible traffic (there are reports of a second airplane in the vicinity) the questionable airspace redesign and the busy ATC environment are all factors that will surely be taken into account by investigators and hopefully airspace designers.
Submitted by robert goyer on November 29, 2011.
An NTSB spokesman was quoted in the Arizona Republic as saying the airplane was in straight and level cruise at 4,500 feet when it hit the ridge, which is borne out by the web video of the crash. This would seem to highlight questions about the airspace design--4500 is 500 feet below the floor of the Class Bravo in the area--and the value of TAWS in cases such as this. The airplane reportedly hit the ridge a few hundred feet below the ridgeline.
Submitted by Todd Knowles on November 29, 2011.
I have 3 points-
1. In a good copy of the video, one can easily see another set of recognition lights above & ahead of the accident airplane. They are not a video artifact of any sort. They continue after the explosion. Doesn't seem to be causative, just interesting.
2. A route a little to the North or especially the South would have taken the accident airplane away from the highest part of the mountains. Being familiar with the area, perhaps the pilot planned to avoid the mountain that way.
3. Has anyone tried flying under the Las Vegas outer class B shelf on the Southwest side of the airspace in the dark? That certainly set off a Terrain Warning in my 430! (I learned big time from that.) The outer edge of it turns out to be awfully close to the rocks. It is much worse than the situation on the East side of the Phoenix class B.
Submitted by ginnyw on November 29, 2011.
Why the heck wouldn't a pilot ask for a climb through Bravo? It doesn't take any time, and there is no prefiling necessary and no burden on the system. I'm sure this is common in this area, and the controllers familiar with its necessity. Up here in the woods there are quite a few guys who would die, and have died, rather than talk to ATC. But a bigtime pilot in a Twin Commander should know every trick to get out of Dodge.
I started flying at KOAK, and we were taught to ask for a Bravo climb regularly - easier on the incoming traffic and the controller, as well as our little planes.
ginny, 2WA1
Submitted by SoCalAviator on November 29, 2011.
I'm also surprised that there are so many pilots who avoid talking to ATC and avoid airspace such as class B. I live in Southern California and request VFR Bravo clearances all the time and it's quite rare that the requests are declined. The secret is to be courteous, professional and comply with instructions as best as possible.
There's really no need to skirt airspace like this and take such risks. Especially in a plane like the Turbo Commander which has the performance not to be in anyone's way in Bravo airspace.
Submitted by SocalFlyer on November 29, 2011.
As pointed out by others, many Class B configurations have sectors that push VFR traffic down virtually into the terrain. Coupled with this is the fact that in some Class B's (think LA) you will virtually never get a VFR clearance to enter and for most of the rest (think Phoenix) availability is spotty at best.
The only solution other than IFR is to pre-plan your route and then fly it with extreme care, preferably with a competent right-seat partner to help out.
Submitted by olasek on November 29, 2011.
If the pilot desired to be out of class B he could have done it by simply following a slightly more southerly track, an insignificant detour, the terrain there was much lower and there was plenty of room to climb after leaving behind the outer perimeter of class B. Seems to me like a very poorly planned departure, I would think that such a mistake is more in line with a student pilot on his first night solo flight but not someone who owns an aviation business and flies twin turbine aircraft. And this is how you fly with your kids?!, I find no excuses here, sorry.
Submitted by TBM Driver on November 29, 2011.
I have spent many years flying in the Phoenix area both VFR and IFR and Class Bravo VFR clearances are just non-existent on the east and west sides. PHX TRACON only accommodates VFR traffic transitioning north or south directly over PHX. An IFR departure out of FFZ to SAD adds quite a few extra miles that makes a VFR departure is very tempting. This night VFR flight can be done safely, but you need fly southeast under the Bravo to the VPREN intersection and then you can circle and climb before heading east without the worry of busting airspace. I agree the PHX airspace redesign is extremely flawed, but the buck stops at the PIC. What a sad situation.
Submitted by olasek on November 29, 2011.
I don't see VPREN but I see IWA VOR. They could fly southeast to this VOR and then follow some easterly radial that would keep them out of the wilderness and restricted areas with room to spare. It seems that out of the possible departure headings they picked the absolute worst.
Submitted by olasek on November 29, 2011.
Ooops, I do see VPREN but it is marked on the sectional chart not on IFR charts. Frnakly I never before expected to see any intersection on a sectional chart, that is not where I would be looking for them. Hopefully VPREN can be found in Jeppesen's databases. You learn something every day ...
Submitted by Gfaris on November 30, 2011.
Unless and until preliminary indications start to flow from the investigators corroborating the theories advanced here, I believe we should retain a cautionary distance from such hasty conclusions. There could very well be “something else”, a distraction or a technical difficulty that contributed to this pilot making a choice with no way out. Some contributors here suggest this pilot was simply incapable of understanding the conflict between wishing to avoid airspace and terrain which meet at a ridgeline. Yet everything we know indicates he was very experienced, familiar with the aircraft, with the area and with that particular flight route, which he made regularly. Speaking for myself, when I depart in mountainous areas, with any chance of obscuration (which includes night) I use a departure procedure to make sure I will be above terrain when I get there. If there is no published procedure, I invent one. In either case, this may involve flying away from the intended course until altitude is reached. It never involves relying on the expected climb performance of the airplane. In this particular case, it would have involved negotiating a clearance into Class Bravo. Until proven otherwise, I’m going to assume I am no smarter than this pilot, who had a precise plan and exercised the necessary precautions to execute his plan, until something hampered or hindered its execution. It may be that his “Plan B” did not contain adequate margins, but until the evidence is in, I’m not on board with those who suggest he just blithely climbed away, hoping to slip between the sliver that exists between the Class B floor and the ridgeline, at night with his family on board, when safe transit would have been only a radio call away to get a clearance.
Submitted by delta_v on November 30, 2011.
As it has been pointed out, it isn't easy to get clearance into the Bravo on the east side. This pilot would probably have known that. The fact that he was flying a route he regularly flies does NOT equate to a free pass for a safe flight along that route. The opposite may in fact be true; complacency kills.
Maybe this pilot invented his own DP.
Since it seems to be clear that the aircraft impacted terrain in straight and level flight, we can probably safely draw some conclusions: 1) It wasn't the airplane's fault 2) It wasn't the mountain's fault 3) It wasn't the Sun's fault.
There aren't a whole lot of things left to point fingers at.
Submitted by Thomas Boyle on November 30, 2011.
SoCalAviator, I've found it virtually impossible to get into the LAX Class B or the SAN Class B when operating VFR.
San Diego's GA airports are squeezed between the approaches to San Diego International to the south, and Miramar to the north. When you take off from KMYF you have Class B down to the surface on both sides of you, just 1 mile to the north, and 3 miles to the south. To escape the city you have to head west (over the ocean) or east (into the mountains). The escape to the north typically involves an end-run around the Miramar B to the east, squeezing between the rocks and watching for the dense VFR traffic doing the same thing. And there's no chance of getting flight following most days, either.
Submitted by psyfly on November 30, 2011.
RE: "SoCalAviator, I've found it virtually impossible to get into the LAX Class B or the SAN Class B when operating VFR"
I learned to fly at the Navy Flying Club at NAS North Island, which lies beneath the SAN Class B. Whenever departing northbound, it was routine to call Lindbergh (SAN) and request a Bravo transition from Point Loma. I made that request many times and was never refused. Did it so any times that the clearance is still memorized: "N12345, proceed northbound, offshore, at or below 500', report at Crystal Pier." Never got declined, even back in end of 2001 and during 2002, when everybody was still paranoid. BTW, it made for a great offshore tour of Mission Beach, La Jolla, and Torrey Pines for pax.
Maybe getting clearances to transition from other areas of the SAN Class B is tougher, or maybe they've tightened up since I transferred, but it was never a problem getting a Bravo transition northbound offshore.
Submitted by ttrippc750 on November 30, 2011.
Could all have been prevented if he had filed an IFR flight plan. In mountanious terrain at night why take the chance flying VFR?
Submitted by se66kw on November 30, 2011.
Several comments here suggest that because a Bravo clearance can be obtained in one locale, it should be available in another. That is clearly not the case. Comparing either PHX or LAS to Southern California just isn't a valid discussion here, as the environments are completely different.
There are many factors at work when a VFR Bravo clearance is issued (or not issued), and getting one in the desert southwest can be difficult at best. Flying around Phoenix and Las Vegas combines busy Bravo airspace with rising terrain. Getting a VFR entry, exit, or transition in either area can be hit or miss, and they'll generally tell you to remain clear of Bravo. Oh sure, they'll give you a code to squawk (thereby adding to the ATC workload tally), though 'remain clear' can hardly be construed as giving Bravo services.
But you can't blame the Bravo airspace for this unfortunate event. Sure, they probably would have climbed higher IF the Bravo airspace was different, or IF a Bravo clearance had been obtained. Would TAWS have helped? One would think so, but apparently not since the airplane was equipped as required. I don't believe this accident was about airspace or failure to use technology, other than to call them 'contributing factors'. It appears a slightly different route that accommodated both the terrain and Bravo airspace would have helped more than anything.
This was a VFR flight - Visual Flight Rules. Saying "we told you so" about an old airspace argument isn't going to change the fact that the PIC, whoever it was, failed to maintain clearance from terrain. As is almost always the case, that's likely what the NTSB report will say.
Submitted by brojer on November 30, 2011.
EA401 crew were trying to fix a bulb problem with the gear indicator. They were all distracted. This according to the book "The Ghost of Flight 401" by Robert Fuller.
Submitted by vanblaricom on November 30, 2011.
Just another case of government weenies going ahead with an airspace plan the danger of which is apparent to everyone but said government weenies. I hope the lawsuits that will surely be filed will cause the FAA to take notice, and a few heads will roll.
Submitted by SocalFlyer on December 01, 2011.
On the general subject of Class B VFR clearances:
You controller types please correct me but my impression has always been that very commonly the controller handling transient VFR traffic does not "own" the Bravo airspace you might wish to enter and would have to engage in time-consuming co-ordination with and/or handoff to whoever is handling the IFR traffic flow you propose to wander through. This is why a "remain clear" is the standard response.
If your request for entry is backed by more than just desire for a short-cut the response will surely be different. Many thanks to the unknown controllers who let me thread my way via CU-bordered pathways down thru MIA's Class B into KTMB a few weeks back!
Submitted by rduke008 on December 01, 2011.
Some pointers about the relationship between improvements in Technologically Advanced Aircraft and aviation safety might be in order.
It is true that technologies have improved safety over the years. But to imply such a cookie-cutter one-size-fits-all approach will eliminate this type of accident fails to show the more profound relationship between man, mission, machine, etc.
Understanding the limitations of new technologies must be part of the training, as well understanding how they might induce over reliance or fixation.
Take the case of the cap flight 182 in Vegas November of 08. A 30,000 hour pilot. A 25,000 hour co-pilot. -A glass cockpit in a year-old Skylane with a G-1000.
There may have been no TAWS to annunciate what the Garmin should have been telling them, but there will always continue to be factors that impact situational awareness where humans are involved.
It is interesting to note that with all of the features & potential to enhance safe flight that glass & other bells and whistles provide, new types of accidents are occurring as well.
-A cirrus pilot fashioned a self-made IMC approach relying on glass to thread a needle thru granite in Oregon. The importance of limitations of such systems shouldn’t be casually discarded, and there are good reasons why manufactures say things like: "Don't use this for primary terrain avoidance."
There are limitations on what can be learned from these accidents. Evidence is usually not "definitive," but rather more of the "consistent with" flavor. The NTSB doesn't issue definitive causes, or even proximate causes, and subtle differences between them must be understood if you really want to understand system safety.
The best glass cockpits provide a lot of useful information that was unimaginable a few short years ago. Yet for all the technology, little has been done to make any real change in the fallible humans that fly them.
Technologically Advanced Aircraft such as the Garmin G-1000 provide relief to the instrument pilot's scan. One should not fail to understand that, even with menus & page upon page of information, they provide no help whatsoever with interpretation & aircraft control.
They can't think for us or cause us to use good judgment. They can't force us into proper habits from preflight to recency of experience and other musts – such as heeding a particular aircraft’s limitations.
Remember: Eastern Airlines 401 had an autopilot disconnect annuciator. An audio alarm rang at the first 250-foot altitude deviation. The radio altimeter chimed 6 times before fate became the hunter. And they had all of 4 guys up there working it out....
Submitted by Konaflygirl757 on February 14, 2012.
I felt compelled to comment here as the mother of the 3 children who perished and ex wife of one of the deceased pilots in this tragedy. I am a CFII/MEI and have flown under part 91,135, and 121. I have recently hiked to the crash site and done as much investigating as possible on my own. After reading the many comments I would like to share my appreciation for your input. In all honesty in the 28 years that I have been flying this is the most bizarre accident I have ever encountered. Knowing the reputation, of the pilots, the maintenance, the aircraft etc. I never had a single reservation about putting my children on that flight. Certainly much speculation has crossed my mind and deprived me of hours of sleep. As a pilot and one who has studied many aviation accidents I know that usually there are several links that contribute to the final demise of a flight. Had any one of those links been broken I would likely not be writing this. Only time and meticulous investigating will hopefully bring the answers we all seek.
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