It was on a cool Texas morning back in October of 2002 when the pilot of a Cirrus SR22 on departure under clear skies felt the controls of his bird acting very strangely. Something just wasn’t right, and a quick check of the left wing showed what it was: the aileron was hanging by a single hinge, leaving the pilot with a hard choice: fly the disabled airplane as it was back to the field and risk losing control and dying in the process or pull the chute and take his chances that the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) would work as advertised and save the day.
In any other airplane, the pilot would have faced no such dilemma. He would have been forced to fly the crippled airplane back to the airport and hope that he had what it took to . . . well, to stay alive in the unpredictable process.
In this case, the pilot, as you’re probably guessing, did the smart thing. He slowed the airplane, cut the engine, pulled the chute and rode the Cirrus down into the mesquite trees, arriving in one piece back on the ground, to fly another day.
That Texas pull was the first deployment of a CAPS in the heat of battle, and since that time there have been more than 22 deployments. The most recent was just last week in Oklahoma when an SR22 went into the trees after the airplane, according to reports, lost power at 11,000 feet. The pilot was quoted as saying he didn’t deploy the chute until 500 feet agl. There’s no NTSB preliminary report at this time, but a local newspaper story said the pilot received minor injuries.
More pertinently, there were no deaths in the incident. Zero. Zilch. Nada. The chute, Cirrus would argue, saved two lives, bringing the total to 22 pulls and 44 lives saved.
But have there really been 22 pulls? And have there really been 44 lives saved?
This latest deployment sparked flame wars on aviation forums once again over the role of the chute—whether it should even be in the airplane in the first place—when and how it should be deployed, and, perhaps most difficult, just what constitutes a deployment and what doesn’t.
At issue are a small number of cases in which the CAPS was deployed and didn’t, at least in the view of some, work, or at least the way some think it should. A website run by the Cirrus Owners and Pilots Association (COPA) lists 23 deployments, of which five resulted in injuries or fatalities. (The site has not yet listed the most recent deployment in Oklahoma.) Of those four, one was after a mid-air collision in an SR20 that was in flames following the collision; three others were deployments when the airplane was below the 1,000-foot certified floor for the CAPS; and another was in an airplane whose pilot had reported heavy ice and activated the chute at an indicated airspeed much greater than that for which CAPS is certified. It’s hard to blame the system for failing to work in situations in which it was, well, not designed to work. It’s no different than blaming an airplane certified to 5 Gs for breaking at 10 Gs.
Now, there have been several deployments outside the envelope that resulted in “saves.” Most of these have been deployments at altitudes lower than 1,000 feet agl. Cirrus counts those events as saves, despite the fact that they were outside the operational envelope of the CAPS. Then again, landing on an active urban waterway is nowhere to be found in the Airbus A320 flight manual. Pilots do what they have to do.
The real question is perhaps unanswerable. Would the 44 pilots and passengers be alive today if the pilots had chosen not to pull the chute? Despite the heightened rhetoric on the forums, there is, clearly, no way to know the answer. But I think it’s clear that at least some, and I’d argue the majority, of those people would not be alive today if it hadn’t been for the chute.
I spoke with Cirrus’s Todd Simmons about the history of the chute, and in Todd’s mind, the controversy is moot. After 10 years, the argument, he says, is as good as settled. “There are around 4,800 Cirrus aircraft with 4 million hours fleet time,” he said. “There have been 44 lives saved. You might argue over what constitutes a ‘deployment,’ but the number of lives saved is a hard number. No one can argue with that figure.”
And no one can argue that the chute sells.
But does it breed a false sense of security?
The answer is “no.” It might breed an increased sense of security, and I’d argue further that this increased sense of security is justified by the increased level of security.
Simmons gets down to the economics of the issue (where one often arrives at something very closely resembling the truth) when he says that after all these years the industry really has weighed in. Last year Chartis Insurance (formerly AIG) waived the deductible in a chute pull for its insured Cirrus airplanes. A number of other insurers followed suit. It is, after all, a lot cheaper for an insurance company to pay for a new airplane than to settle an accidental death claim, or two, or three, or four.
I don’t think any pilot is thinking about his or her deductible when it comes down to the decision to pull the chute or not in the event of an in-flight emergency. The pilots who have made pulls were simply thinking about saving their skins. There are, indeed, some real pressures not to make the pull, including the fear of not being in control of the outcome of the flight and the fear of being looked down upon by other pilots for using the chute.
I wish it weren’t so. I never heard anyone faulting Sean Tucker for using his personal parachute to bail out of his disabled aerobatic airplane a couple of years ago. It’s really no different.
Besides, all other things being equal, if the insurance company were there in the heat of the moment to offer its best advice, that guidance would be clear: “Pull.”
It’s good advice. As Simmons points out, you can always buy another airplane.
**************************************
Check out the photo gallery we created to accompany the story I wrote about the chute back in 2004, when the first few pulls had just happened and the controversy was fresh.
Comments (15)
Post a comment
All Comments
Submitted by wlincourt@gmail.com on August 26, 2010.
Robert,
Very well written piece. I liked the position you took and your inductive arguments in favor of the BRS were strong and convincing. Well done.
Best personal regards,
Wayne
Submitted by vanblaricom on August 26, 2010.
Cirrus certainly needs something like a parachute to make people forget about the high accident rate of these airplanes. The highly published stall/spin accidents are a direct result of Cirrus' choice to ignore the need for spin recovery. Abbreviating the tail, and pushing the single engine stall speed requirement gained them a few knots, but at what price?
Submitted by PilotEricB on August 26, 2010.
I thoroughly disagree with your contention that the presence of the chute doesn't breed a false sense of security. The phenomenon of "risk homeostasis" is well documented in the literature (see the April 2009 issue of NAFI Mentor for a more thorough treatment of this topic.) Rather than providing increased levels of security, the presence of multiple layers of advanced technology (such as large-screen MFD's, weeping wing TKS systems, and the CAPS parachute) prompt users to accept higher levels of flight risk than they would have ordinarily have avoided. In other words, the risk margin doesn't increase with this technology, the user simply increases his level of acceptable risk because of the technology. The risk margin remains thin as the user seeks a new level of "homeostasis."
A good example of this is winter drivers with 4 wheel drive. Ordinarily, in slippery conditions most drivers of non-4WD vehicles would be motivated to slow down. Instead, many 4WD drivers simply engage the traction control and drive at normal speeds, based on the perception that they are "protected" from reduced traction. Unfortunately this incorrect perception results in many avoidable car accidents.
The bottom line is that the presence of advanced technology results in a user's inability to correctly perceive the risks involved. This results in overconfidence and an inability to properly manage risk. The presence of advanced technology has not "stopped" accidents, nor will it, until human error is better explained and accepted by GA pilots of advanced aircraft.
Submitted by kenperkins on August 26, 2010.
I can not agree with Pilot Eric B. Virtually all ( OK, almost) all pilots I know are intelligent, careful and skillful pilots who do not and/or would not take unreasonable risks in their flying, because of added levels of emergency security equipment. The 4X example is bogus. Knowledgeable, experienced and intelligent drivers of 4X vehicles know that just because engaging the all wheel drive will give you better traction to accelerate, it will not help one bit in slowing or turning on icy roads. The most important piece of gear you need to keep engaged is the brain - in all circumstances. Intelligent reliance on added levels of security gear is part of the exercise.
Submitted by Cautious Aviator on August 26, 2010.
I think the Cirrus has an appalling safety record and that it's claim to be a safe aircraft is entirely bogus. The accident rate is worse than the GA average and if you add in the 'saves' it's really bad. The chute allowed certification shortcuts originally and required a springier gear that is killing pilots today. Simple safety measures like a door open sensor wod stop cirrus pilots freaking out and crashing after their defectively designed doors pop open in flight. They're a dangerous aircraft.
Submitted by dibbelld on August 26, 2010.
I have no real problem with the BRS parachute as a feature any Cirrus buyer gets as part of the deal. My bigger concern with the Cirrus design (echoing "vanblaricom" above) is that the aircraft was certified without full demonstration of spin recovery in the conventional manner. It makes no sense to me (correct me if I'm wrong - this is what I understand) to certify a light aircraft for which the only "approved" method of recovery from an inadvertent spin is to pop the 'chute. I think Cirrus should undertake whatever modifications are necessary, perform the additional testing showing conventional recovery, amend the certification data, amend the flight manual, incorporate the changes from here on out, and offer retrofits.
In contrast to the Cirrus approach, I give Cessna a lot of credit for sticking with the Skycatcher program and making robust modifications to that design to ensure adequate spin recovery.
Submitted by sitrep on August 26, 2010.
I recently trained as a Cirrus instructor (CSIP) after years of teaching in everything else (10K hours dual given). I found the SR-22 to be exceptionally well designed and docile in the slow flight and stall regime. I stalled it turning and cross-controlled and found it very stable. The chute is there as an additional option and and because they did not choose to spin test this plane is no reflection on it's design and flight characteristics.Why go there when you have a chute anyway? This is a huge expense (witness Cessna) The Cirrus is the latest candidate for the "doctor killer" phenomenon we saw in the Bonanza, then the Mooney and finally Malibus. The training at Cirrus is exceptional but nothing will adequately prepare a student or new private for the speed and complexity of an SR-22. I agree with EricB on this, the extra technology will enable and embolden pilot risk-taking...you still have to be able to fly!
Submitted by PilotEricB on August 26, 2010.
KenPerkin's comments deserve an answer. First, he states: "Virtually all ( OK, almost) all pilots I know are intelligent, careful and skillful pilots who do not and/or would not take unreasonable risks in their flying, because of added levels of emergency security equipment." To this I would say firstly that the statistics do not support your argument. Secondly, research has shown that pilots of all stripes are prone to overconfidence and bias concerning their own tolerance for risk. ALL pilots think they are safe, conservative pilots. In years of delivering aviation seminars I have yet to have a pilot publicly admit otherwise. Yet somehow dozens of these same "intelligent, careful, and skillful" pilots die every year taking risks they might not have ordinarily taken. The presence of advanced technologies in the cockpit (whether it be TKS, a parachute, weather datalink, etc.) certainly plays a role in these situations.
Secondly, Ken argues: "The 4X example is bogus. Knowledgeable, experienced and intelligent drivers of 4X vehicles know that just because engaging the all wheel drive will give you better traction to accelerate, it will not help one bit in slowing or turning on icy roads." The example is not bogus - it is entirely to the point. I think you completely missed the point of my argument. It is not "knowledgable, experienced, and intelligent" drivers of 4WD vehicles who have these accidents. It's people who are lulled into a sort of complacency or false sense of invulnerability by the technology who end up spinning out and crashing. Like it or not, the "doctor killer" reputation is being resurrected. So much time is being spent during training on managing the fancy automation that even fundamental skills like basic aircraft control are being neglected. Nor can there be much _serious_ emphasis on risk management or the proper attitude towards technology - this runs completely counter to the sales pitch for these aircraft as the "anytime, anywhere" flying contraption for the busy and well-to-do professional.
Lastly, Ken states: "The most important piece of gear you need to keep engaged is the brain - in all circumstances. Intelligent reliance on added levels of security gear is part of the exercise." I completely agree; however, any reasonable observer should readily see that we are not yet at the stage where "intelligent reliance" on technology is being properly taught or widely adopted.
Submitted by johnbpatson on August 27, 2010.
The parachutes were initially developed for non-motorized hang gliders. It is a lovely sport, pure flying but a killer because holes in the air are not visible. Rocket parachutes made it a bit safer. They also make other aircraft a bit safer. In Europe microlight regulations changed to allow for the extra weight of a rocket parachute system, with the max take off weight for an equipped aircraft 472 kg as opposed to 450 kg for a non-equipped one. It is now difficult to sell second-hand microlights without a parachute, because flying without one makes the flight a little bit less safe -- even if your normal landing run is only 100m.
Submitted by dochelp1m on August 27, 2010.
You all make good points , I would never jump out of a perfectly good aircraft , But if I was wearing a chute and the aircraft broke , I would not hesitate to jump or if on the airframe deploy a chute like the BSR . I'll argue about it after the fact if possible !
Submitted by chofujohn on September 02, 2010.
I wonder how Eric the Pilot would feel about BRS if he lost his tail feathers while inadvertently penetrating a big cell at night over Florida. Been there, done that and it ain't pleasant. I survived my encounter, but for those who didn't I wonder how they'd have felt hanging from a parachute floating gently to the ground? The point was already made about flying airplanes within design limits, so I won't have to go there. Cirrus airplanes are safe and they can not be blamed for the failure of pilots to operate them correctly. If you want to complain about something complain about inadaquate pilot training and the absence of mandatory recurrent training. I'd get on a soapbox for that argument. But, don't ever think ANY airplane is 100% safe because if sufficiently stressed ALL airplanes are vulnerable to catastrophic failure. Mooney used to lay claim to never having had a structural failure up until just a few years ago when some fellow pointed his at the ground, failed to retard the throttle and pulled as hard as he could. It happens. Was the Mooney at fault? Certainly not!
Eric the Pilot believes he understands something significant about human nature and risk and he uses a really loose and less than meaningful analogy of 4x4's as his example. It's all just complete and utter nonsense and it shouldn't be dignified with legitimate debate. There are always naysayers like Eric the Pilot and they can never be convinced they are wrong. It's best to just leave them alone to stew in their own negativity. Want to know the real value of the BRS system? Ask any survivor. According to the BRS website 255 lives have been saved so far. It doesn't matter that the vast majority were flying hang gliders and ultralights. A life is a life. And that number is just the tip of the iceberg. What is not ever counted are the survivor's friends and family members who add even more value to the equation.
Accidents will always be common when operating machinery, especially machinery that goes fast, flies high and must share the sky with weather. Airplanes break, but most importantly they break even when a sober thinking and totally responsible pilot is at the helm. We can all agree that pilot error is the most common cause of accidents, not mechanical failure, so maybe education is the answer to a better safety record. I can not side with people like Eric the Pilot because he'd throw the baby out with the bathwater. To Eric the Pilot's credit I will concede, however, that there is always some small contingent of individuals who will abuse their pilot privileges and take unnecessary risks. Thus the expression, "there are old pilots and there are bold pilots, but there are no old, bold pilots". And it should be pointed out that even the best, most seasoned pilots are capable of making a mistake in judgment.
The bottom line is that BRS chutes ARE the bottom line when all other options have been exhausted. When the worst scenario is unfolding right before your very eyes and conventional remedies have failed I think even Eric the Pilot would be grateful for the ability to save his own life. That is likely the only way he'd ever change his mind.
It's so easy to be critical and negative, but to be critical of life saving equipment that should, IMO, be standard issue on ALL aircraft is just not right thinking. If I had my way there would be BRS chute systems installed on everything from 747's to C-172's. The only real problem I can see with BRS chutes is that they are not developed for every class of airplane and they can't be easily retrofitted to other aircraft.
I'm reminded of the Air France A320 in-flight breakup out of Rio where hundreds died a few years ago. I wonder if their loved ones would agree with me or with Eric the Pilot about the value of BRS?
Submitted by flyingclay on September 06, 2010.
(1) Wonder if Honda GoldWing riders that have the upgraded air bags and ABS brakes have a higher rate of accidents because they are more wreckless due to the false sense of security?
(2) Am new to GA/Sport Pilot, however the new LSA I will be purchasing in the future will have a BRS. After observing the discussion about BRS, there are two things I hope. (a) I never have to use it and (b) by having it, I dont become stupid/wreckless.
Submitted by PilotEricB on September 08, 2010.
Chofujohn,
If you would bother to pay attention to other people's posts, rather than engage in silly personal attacks and ranting, your contribution to the discussion would be much more meaningful.
1) Never once did I say I am AGAINST parachutes on board an aircraft. I simply want people to realize that, like any piece of technology it has some drawbacks as well as benefits. You would have recognized that if you had bothered to read what I wrote instead of showing up hell bent on starting an argument.
2) The 4X4 argument is PRECISELY to the point. Just because you want to call it "complete and utter nonsense" doesn't make it so. Rather than being intellectually honest about it, you decide to mock other people's arguments rather than actually discuss them intelligently. You are either incapable of, or apparently unwilling to approach this discussion with an open mind. If you would bother to consult any of the literature on "risk homeostasis" you may see it differently.
3) The argument that somehow an air carrier aircraft such as a B747 or A340 could be equipped with BRS reflects a serious lack of understanding of the technical limitations involved. Furthermore, even a cursory examination of recent hull losses of commercial aircraft reveals that there are few if any circumstances where a BRS could have even been of benefit. This is wishful thinking.
4) You want to paint me as a naysayer. Anyone like Chofujohn who wants to paint the BRS as some magical lifesaving system without any drawbacks is not only being intellectually dishonest but is also promoting a dangerous and foolish attitude.
Submitted by AboveTheFray on September 24, 2010.
I fail to see the 'drawback' in having a (potentially) lifesaving device on board any aircraft, or any other conveyance for that matter. The gist of PilotEricB's argument seems to be that technology (and it's attendant "risk homeostasis") is 'dumbing' pilots down. And no, thank you, I prefer not to consult any of the literature on "risk homeostasis", as fascinating as it may be.
Resistance to technology is nothing new. The horseless carriage would maim and murder peaceful town folk nationwide.VOR/DME was to be the death knell of pilotage and dead reckoning. Autopilots would lead to generations of button-pushers and knob-twisters instead of pilots who could actually fly a plane. GPS would produce pilots who circled aimlessly, unable to determine their whereabouts until crashing, out of fuel. The proliferation of the internet would turn our children into mushy-brained, wide-eyed zombies, incapable of coherent thought. The jury is still out on that one, come to think of it, but the early signs aren't good.
Many drivers of 4x4s do, indeed, "simply engage the traction control and drive at normal speeds, based on the perception that they are 'protected' from reduced traction", largely because they are. A 4WD vehicle does have better traction than a 2WD, hence the reason it exists and sells so well. The fact that some drivers overestimate the benefit of improved traction (and 'drive at normal speeds' when they probably shouldn't) does not obviate that benefit.
Similarly, pilots may seek a new level of homeostasis (or whatever) after having perceived the benefits of advanced technology--MFDs, TKS, WX datalinks and CAPS included--but that perception does not obviate the benefits. MFDs provide us with ease of navigation and flight planning, along with a host of other benefits. TKS allows us to shed or prevent ice build-up, WX datalinks allow us to avoid the ice (or worse) in the first place, and Cirrus' chutes allow us to fly another day if we've failed to realize the benefits of the others.
If a wing departs from my Pitts, I'm going to bail out and pull the chute, regardless of my homeostatic state. If I'm in a Cirrus and a wing departs, or if I ham-fist it into a departure stall, or manage to enter a unrecoverable spin, I'll pull the chute. In no case will I consider that the chute emboldened me. Rather, I'll thank God and probably give a nod to the technology, too.
Couch it as he may, PilotEricB seems to espouse a particularly vehement brand of 'survival of the fittest'. I'm all for competence and accountability, but I won't hesitate to use any and all means available to save my hide if and when the time comes, even if it's all my fault in the first place. If CAPS is one of those means, I'll be quite happy to circumvent PilotEricB's weed-out-the-weak policy.
Now, where did I park my Jeep?
Submitted by Anonymous on October 18, 2010.
Come on, this thing is a Beer Cooler.
It will not last more than a few years as opposed to a 50 year old real airplane if properly maintained. The fantasy will come to an end soon and owners will lose.
Every time I walk past the Cirrus tent at OSH or LKL and look at the price for this plastic mess I say loud and clear:
"Dooh , I could have had a Bonanza"
Top Rated
Your Comment
All submitted comments are subject to the license terms set forth in our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use
